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[Tihe compromise the Court may make in this area is going to
last longer than a lifetime.
-Assistant District Attorney James Duggan, during oral
argument in Peters v. New York, December 12, 19671
[W]e are writing a new kind of probablecause.
-Justice Abe Fortas, in the Supreme Court's conference on
Terry v. Ohio, December 13, 19672
There is, of course, no reason to use the "reasonablesuspicion"
term unless it means something more or something less than
probablecause ....
-Justice Hugo L. Black, in his proposed concurring opinion in
Terry v. Ohio, circulated February 19, 1968'

I.

INTRODUCTION

In our system of constitutional decision-making, the Supreme Court makes law as an institution in its formal written
opinions. The Court and its individual members make their official legal marks in the printed pages of the United States Reports. In June 1968, in Terry v. Ohio4 and Sibron v. New York,'
' Oral Argument Transcript at 51, Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (No.
67-74).
2 Handwritten note of Justice William O. Douglas from the Conference on Terry
v. Ohio (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Terry Notes].
Justice Hugo L. Black, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 19, 1968:
Terry v. Ohio 5 (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives) [hereinafter Black Concurring Draft Circulated Feb. 19, 1968:

Terry].

4 392 U.S.

1 (1968).
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the two decisions that approved the constitutionality under the
Fourth Amendment of police stop and frisk practices, the Court
filled many official pages with rich discussion.6 Over the ensuing
thirty years, these Court and individual opinions have shaped
the course of constitutional analysis in our courts and guided the
conduct of law enforcement officers on our streets.
This article looks behind the pages of the United States Reports to information that illuminates the Court's decisionmaking, including the specific roles that individual Justices
played, in the 1968 stop and frisk cases. Seven of the nine Justices who served during the October 1967 Term have left history
with extensive documentation of the Court's stop and frisk decision-making. Four of the Justices left papers and other records
that are openly available in research libraries: Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and Associate Justices William 0. Douglas, John M.
Harlan, and Thurgood Marshall.7 Three other Justices left papers that are available for review with the permission of the respective Justice's executor: Associate Justices Hugo L. Black,8
William J. Brennan, Jr.,9 and Abe Fortas. ° Each of these collec392 U.S. 40 (1968).
In June 1968, in addition to deciding Terry and Sibron, the Court also dismissed, as improvidently granted, the petition for writ of certiorari in a fourth case
that raised stop and frisk issues. See Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598
(1968) (per curiam). Five Justices filed or joined individual opinions that accompanied the dismissal of the writ in Wainwright. See id. Although those opinions, which
accompanied a Court decision of no precedential force, have not surprisingly been
less important than the Terry and Sibron opinions, Wainwright's timing and the
content of the opinions that were filed in the case make it part of the constellation of
1968's stop and frisk cases. The Court also, in its internal deliberations during the
October 1967 Term, treated Wainwright as a stop and frisk case.
7 The Warren, Douglas and Marshall Papers are in
the Manuscript Division of
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The Harlan Papers are in the Seeley G.
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
" The Black Papers are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, in
Washington, D.C. They do not contain Justice Black's conference notes, however, for
they were burned at his instruction shortly before his death in September 1971. See
infra note 187.
The Brennan Papers are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, in
Washington, D.C. The Brennan Papers contain extensive case history memoranda
that Justice Brennan and/or his law clerks prepared at the end of each Court Term.
In Justice Brennan's bequest to the Library of Congress, he wrote that he
" 'anticipate[d] that access to any case histories would rarely be justified... and
that if access is granted, it would be under conditions precluding public quotation of
any part of any case history .' " Letter from William J. Brennan III to John Q. Barrett (Mar. 12, 1998) (on file with author) (quoting the terms of the writer's father's
"gift of his documents to the Library of Congress"). Despite the obvious historical
6

6
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tions contains a range of extraordinary documentary information
about many topics, including the Court's consideration of the
stop and frisk cases thirty years ago."
As Justice Frankfurter once cautioned, the information
about the Supreme Court that can be found in surviving documents should not be mistaken for a complete and accurate history of the Court's work. 2 Frankfurter's caution was about
reading too much into, or gathering too much from, the Court's
reported decisions, but his advice applies equally to all of the
Court's, and the Justices', written work product. Much of the
Justices' work, like any human activity, gets done through private thoughts, in-person meetings, and oral conversations that
are never recorded and thus are lost to history. Documents also
depict events in isolation, failing to capture the full docket that
is both ordinary life and the work of a Supreme Court Term.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the documents that do exist
regarding the stop and frisk cases add to our understanding of
the Justices' thinking, working styles and work product at particular points in time. They also illuminate the Court's decisionmaking, and they add to our general historical knowledge of the
Warren Court and the individual Justices who comprised it. The
documents also help us to understand that Terry, which we know
today as a touchstone of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, was, at its origin, a series of open questions that the Justices worked out for themselves in a diligent, pragmatic, some-

value of Justice Brennan's case histories, only one of them has been described publicly. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLWAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 164-65 (1991) (describing Justice Brennan's law clerk's account of the
writing of the New York Times v. Sullivan opinion).
' The Fortas Papers are in the Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, in New Haven, Connecticut. Because this collection has not been completely
processed, it is not possible to cite to specific containers or folders.
"1The papers of two other members of the 1967-68 Warren Court, Associate
Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White, may also add to this record, but they
are not currently available to researchers. Justice Stewart deposited his papers at
the Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, but all of his Supreme
Court files "are closed pending retirement of all Supreme Court justices who served
with [him]." E-mail from Nancy Lyon, Librarian, Yale University, to John Q. Barrett
(July 28, 1998) (on file with author). Justice White has deposited his Supreme Court
case files at the Library of Congress, but they will not be opened to researchers until
ten years after his death. Telephone Interview with John E. Haynes, 20th Century
Political Historian, Library of Congress Manuscript Division (July 9, 1998).
12 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 311, 311
(1955).
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what anguished and entirely human fashion. The documents, by
revealing some of the choices made and the paths not taken,
remind us powerfully that constitutional criminal procedure is,
within the broad framework of the Fourth Amendment, as much
an ongoing process of deciding as it is a business of applying
known doctrinal categories.
This article is based upon the available papers of the former
Supreme Court Justices.13 It chronicles the Court's deciding of
the stop and frisk cases during its October 1967 Term. Part II
describes the setting: the Justices of the Warren Court, the
emergence of stop and frisk as a constitutional issue, and the
paths by which four stop and frisk cases-Terry v. Ohio, Sibron v.
New York, Peters v. New York," and Wainwright v. City of New

Orleans'l-reached the Court. Part III tracks these cases from
their acceptance for Supreme Court review, through the Justices
votes in conference. It describes in detail the Justices' remarks
and positions during their private conference discussions of the
stop and frisk cases. Part IV chronicles the first phase of the
Court's opinion-writing process. It examines Chief Justice Warren's efforts to write opinions for the Court that decided the
cases under the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement and the varying, though generally unsatisfied, reactions he
received from his colleagues. Part V describes how Justice
Brennan persuaded Warren to abandon the probable cause approach in favor of an analysis based on the Fourth Amendment's
first clause, which prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures. Part VI shows how Warren garnered a Court with this
"reasonableness" approach but lost the vote of Justice Douglas,
who decided to dissent. It also discusses the Court's announcement of its stop and frisk decisions, and its dismissal of Wainwright. Part VII concludes the article by considering what the
papers of the Supreme Court Justices tell us about the Court's
process of decision-making, its diligent and capable work, its
choices among differing ways to frame and resolve the constitutional questions about police stops and frisks, the openness of
those questions thirty years ago, and the societal circumstances
'3For an excellent overview of this kind of research, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES vii-xii (1996).

392 U.S. 40 (1968).
U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
14

15 392
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in which the Court decided them.
II.

A.

THE SUPREME COURT SETTING FOR THE STOP AND FRISK
DECISIONS

The Justices of the 1967 Warren Court

The Court that heard and decided the stop and frisk cases
during the October 1967 Term was the Warren Court late in, but
fully in, its prime. Earl Warren had been the Chief Justice of the
United States since 1953, and he was beginning what he hoped
would be his final Term on the Court. 6 The Associate Justices
who were serving with Warren were the two surviving, and longserving, Roosevelt appointees, Hugo L. Black and William 0.
Douglas; three seasoned Eisenhower appointees, John Marshall
Harlan, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Potter Stewart; the remaining Kennedy appointee, Byron R. White, President Johnson's appointee Abe Fortas; and, in his first Term as the Court's
first black member, a second Johnson appointee, Thurgood Mar-

shall. 7
Although available Court papers tell much about how the
Court rendered its 1968 decisions in the stop and frisk cases, the
documents do not illuminate the personal experiences and rela-

tionships that were a part of each Justice who participated in the
decisions. Warren was a former prosecutor with vast experience
working with and around police officers. 8 Black found himself
16In June 1968, shortly after the Court decided the stop and frisk cases, Chief
Justice Warren announced his intention to resign from the Court upon confirmation
of his successor. President Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Warren as Chief Justice. When the Fortas nomination was withdrawn later in
1968, Warren agreed to serve as Chief Justice for the Court's October 1968 Term.
He resigned from the Court when Warren E. Burger's nomination to serve as Chief
Justice of the United States was confirmed in 1969. See TYRONE BROWN, Clerking

for the Chief Justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 276, 280-81

(Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1996) (a Warren law clerk's memoir of the October 1967
Term, including Warren's June 1968 decision to announce his resignation).
17 A small piece of the stop and frisk decision-making
preceded Justice Marshall's arrival on the Court. His predecessor, Justice Tom C. Clark, had been part of
the Court's votes to review the Sibron and Peters appeals, and to grant the petition
for a writ of certiorari in Terry. See Docket Sheets: Sibron v. New York, Peters v.
New York, Terry v. Ohio (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, cont. 415,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
18 See

generally LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1967).

Warren's family also had been victimized by violent crime. In 1938, while he was
serving as the District Attorney in Alameda County, California, Warren's father was
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during the late 1960s increasingly in disagreement with the
Court's criminal procedure decisions he struggled with the dissenter's role as he, the Court's oldest member, also began to
show his age. 9 Harlan, often aligned with Black in dissent, was
virtually blind but continued to accomplish yeoman's work, including the writing of many separate opinions. 20 Douglas, almost
thirty years a Justice, was the Court's brilliant loner.2 Brennan,
by contrast, was the Court's alliance-builder and the Chief Justice's closest adviser and collaborator.2 2 Stewart was truly the
swing Justice; he did not, for example, write a dissenting opinion
in a Fourth Amendment case until the mid-1970s. 23 White, on
the Court five years, had established himself as an independent
thinker and a Justice who was deferential to the policy judgments of officials in the political branches of government, including officials in municipal law enforcement. 24 Fortas was still
brutally murdered during an apparent robbery. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 94-96 (1997) (describing the crime but not the police
investigation). Although investigators apprehended the likely perpetrator, they interrogated him so coercively that Warren's staff, with his approval, declined to
prosecute the man. See KATCHER, supra, at 101-02.
'9 See generally ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994); TONY
FREYER, HUGO L. BLACK AND THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 151-52
(1990).
20See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT
DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT (1992).
21 See William A. Reppy, Jr., Justice Douglas and His Brethren: A Personal
Recollection, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 412, 421, 426 n.85 (1981) (reviewing BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979), by one of
Justice Douglas's law clerks during the October 1967 Term); see also Sidney E. Zion,
At 70, the 'Youngest' Justice of All, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1969, at 26 (describing
Douglas as the Court's "most liberal member, its quickest and many feel most brilliant mind, its fastest writer and surely its most colorful and controversial character").
22 See, e.g., KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN,
JR.,
AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 141 (1993) ("Each week before
the Court's full conference with all nine judges, Warren called Brennan to his chambers. There they went over the cases that would be discussed the following day.");
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 229 (1980) (describing Warren's habit, shortly after he became
Chief Justice, of discussing each oral argument case with Brennan prior to the
Court's conference; '[t]he two of them had, so to speak, a 'mock' conference").
2 See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Potter Stewart: Decisional Patterns in
Search of Doctrinal Moorings, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL
PROFILES 375, 395 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).
2" See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (White,
J.,
joined by Warren, C.J., and by Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas, JJ.) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment requires municipal health and safety inspectors to obtain a
warrant before they may enter a private residential apartment, but that constitu-
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growing into the role of a Supreme Court Justice while also
functioning as one of President Johnson's closest advisers on
domestic, foreign, and political issues.'
Marshall had been
sworn in during 1967 after stints as the Solicitor General of the
United States, a federal appellate judge, and, before his government service began, decades as Director Counsel of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (LDF)."

The Justices' papers also do not say much about the societal
cauldron in which the Court considered and decided the stop and
frisk cases. The events that occurred during the pendency of
tional probable cause for such an inspection will be present where "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling"); see also Lance Liebman, Swing Man on the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 8, 1972, at 16, 95. Leibman notes:
White, the former Deputy Attorney General, is more willing than many
justices to grant leeway to public officials, to accept their statements of necessity, to approve their discretionary choices. His opinions show great
sympathy for the official-whether Cabinet Officer or patrolman-who is
given a messy, complicated job, without the resources or training he really
needs, and is then second guessed by judges after the event.
Id. See generally DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE
(1998); Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Byron White's Appointment to the Supreme Court,
58 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 431 (1987); William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to
Deference in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U.
COLO. L. REV. 347 (1987).
25 See generally LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY
293-313, 316-18
(1990); see also ABE FORTA, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968)
(published during the pendency of Fortas's nomination to be Chief Justice of the
United States). One demonstration of Fortas's dual role is a handwritten note,
marked "Personal," that he sent to Chief Justice Warren in February 1968. See Letter from Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Feb. 9, 1968) (available in
Earl Warren Papers, cont. 352, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Fortas
listed three specific items from "the President's Crime message" that "could be
helped by the Judicial Conference or other appropriate agencies" and told Warren
that "he [President Johnson] asks help." Id.
26 See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 338-39 (1998).
Being stopped by a police officer while he was walking on a public street was
one of the "shock[ing]" life experiences that Justice Marshall had before he joined
the Supreme Court. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 295
(1994). This incident occurred in 1961, while Marshall was waiting for the Senate to
act on President Kennedy's nomination that Marshall serve as a Circuit Judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Marshall was stopped as
he walked toward the LDF's Manhattan office by a police officer who questioned him
about "why he was following a woman who was walking ahead of him." I- "The officer demanded identification, wrote down [Marshall's] name and other information,
and did nothing further." Id.
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these Supreme Court cases included a crime explosion across the
country; destructive urban riots; unrest in the so-called urban
ghettos, some of it arising from racial tensions between residents
and the police;27 growing unrest, among students and, generally,
regarding the Vietnam War; Richard Nixon campaigning for the
presidency by highlighting the crime problem and attacking the
Court's criminal law decisions; 8 President Johnson's efforts to
pass new anti-crime legislation; his decision not to seek reelection; and catastrophic acts of gun violence, including the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and, just days before the
Court handed down its stop and frisk decisions, Senator Robert
F. Kennedy."
The Justices' stop and frisk opinions and their
available papers mention almost none of these developments, but
they could not have been irrelevant to the Justices' thinking and
deciding.
B.

The Emergence of Stop and Frisk ConstitutionalIssues
As Professor LaFave has described, the "road to Terry"" was
a surprisingly long one. For a long time prior to the 1960s, police
officers had been stopping, questioning, and frisking people on
31
the street who they lacked probable cause or warrants to arrest,
27 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of CriminalProcedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-58 (1998) (arguing that virtually
all of the Warren Court's landmark criminal procedure decisions of the 1960's arose
from contexts of institutionalized racism).
28 See generally JAMES F. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE
SUPREME COURT IN
RICHARD NIXON'S AMERICA 3, 4-7, 8-9 (1973).
2 Senator Kennedy was shot in California late in the evening of Tuesday, June
4, 1968. He died on the afternoon of Thursday, June 6, 1968. The crowd of more than
2,000 people who attended his funeral on Saturday, June 8, 1968, in New York's St.
Patrick's Cathedral included Chief Justice Warren. See J. Anthony Lukas, Thousands In Last Tribute To Kennedy; Service At Arlington Is Held At Night, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1968, at 53. All invited dignitaries were subjected to close scrutiny as
they entered the Cathedral. See id. ("As the dignitaries walked up the steps, their
invitations were checked carefully by plainclothes men. Mrs. Martin Luther King
had her card carefully scrutinized; even Pierre Salinger, President Kennedy's press
secretary, had brief trouble getting in."); cf Seth S. King, Tight Security Catches
Man With Empty Gun Entering Cathedral, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1968, at 54
(describing the arrest of a man on the street outside the Cathedral, whose attach6
case was found to contain an unloaded revolver; adjacent photograph depicts a law
enforcement officer looking into the briefcase of a mourner outside the Cathedral).
Two days later, on Monday, June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Sibron, Peters and Terry.
38 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1(a) (3d ed. 1996).
3, One early judicial opinion describes a police officer in Brooklyn, New York,
who was shot and killed while he was "engaged in searching Italians." People v.
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but the legal system was slow to focus on the constitutionality of
these police practices. One explanation may be that police stops
and frisks always have been "low visibility" practices." They often did not result in seizures of tangible evidence, arrests or, ultimately, prosecutions and criminal convictions. As a result, the
innocent victims of stops and frisks were probably glad that their
bad encounters with the police came to an end, and understandably, chose not to make issues of why and how they were
stopped and frisked at all.
The litigation that was occurring concerning stops and frisks
did not swiftly force the Supreme Court to confront the constitutionality of these practices. In one precursor to the 1968 stop
and frisk cases, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)
asked the Court to determine only whether a warrantless police
stop and detention (involving, at its inception, an automobile
stop) had been an arrest based upon probable cause." Because
DOJ did not claim that the law enforcement conduct at issue was
something less than an arrest that lawfully could occur on some
basis less than probable cause, the Court did not need to decide
whether police officers may constitutionally make a non-arrest
stop in the absence of probable cause.' In another early case involving an automobile stop, the Court remanded the case for further development of the factual record, and thus, sidestepped the
DOJ's claim that it could, in the absence of probable cause, stop
Marendi, 107 N.E. 1058, 1060 (N.Y. 1915). According to the New York Court of Appeals' majority opinion, a government witness testified that the officer,
[ijust before overtaking the defendant [Marendi] and [a second man
named] Scaltifalso,... stopped an Italian, searched him, and, not finding
anything,... told him to go back. He... searched Scaltifalso and, again
not finding anything,... told him "to get out of there." He started to
search the defendant when a scuffle ensued and a pistol discharged, killing
the officer.
Id.
32 See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 9.1(a), at 4 (quoting Herman Schwartz,
Stop
and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. LAW,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 433, 463 (1967)).
3See
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959) ("The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to the concession here, that the arrest took place when the
federal agents stopped the car. That is our view on the facts of this particular case.")
(footnote omitted).
34 But see Henry, 361 U.S. at 104 (Clark, J., joined by Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(refusing to accept the government's concession that a car stop constituted an arrest, and concluding that "[t]he suspicious activities of the petitioner during the
somewhat prolonged surveillance by the agents warranted the stopping of the car"
before they acquired "indisputable probable cause for the search and arrest").
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someone "for the purpose of routine interrogation,... [with] no
intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission."3 5 In other cases, including ones arising
under the stop and frisk statute that New York enacted in
1964,36 the Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of certiorari, and thus "ducked" the constitutional issues regarding police stops and frisks. 8
Other legal forces and actors did not wait for the Supreme
Court to define the propriety of stops and frisks. Among the
states, New York took the lead by enacting a statute that
authorized such police activity.39 In 1966, the American Law Institute promulgated a draft Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure that addressed stopping of suspects for investigation.0 In
1967, President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice recommended that more "state legislatures enact statutory provisions prescribing the authority of law
41
enforcement officers to stop persons for brief questioning.
Lower courts, particularly in the states, also were deciding more
stop and frisk cases and offering increasingly substantive analyses of the Fourth Amendment issues they raised.42 Scholarly research and writing about law enforcement matters also was focusing attention on stop and frisk issues.4 3 It was only a matter

3" Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960).
36 See Act of Mar. 2, 1964, ch. 86, sec. 2, § 180-a, 1964 N.Y. Laws 111
(authorizing a police officer to "stop any person.., whom he reasonably suspects is
committing, has committed or is about to commit" a crime and to search that person
if the officer "reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb") (codified at
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a) (1964) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
140.50 (McKinney 1992)).
37 See People v. Pugach, 204 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 936
(1965); People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965).
38 Memorandum by Daniel P. Levitt, Law Clerk to Justice Abe Fortas, regarding
Sibron v. New York 3 (Oct. Term 1966) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives) ("The Court has ducked this issue before
(see Rivera and Pugach).").
9 See supra note 36.
40 See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 9.1(a), at 6.
" Id. § 9.1(a), at 5 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967)).
42 See, e.g., Terry v. State, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App.
1966), affd, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
13 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 9.1(a), at 2 n.3 (listing
various law review
articles written in the 1960s on stop and frisk issues); L. TIFFANY, ET AL., FIELD
SURVEYS IV: A REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S
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of time before the Court addressed the constitutional questions
regarding police stops and frisks.
C. The Court Takes the Cases
1. Wainwright v. New Orleans
The first of the "stop and frisk" cases that reached the Supreme Court beginning in 1966, and that the Court accepted for
review in early 1967, was Wainwright v. New Orleans.44 Wainwright arose from a street encounter between police and a pedestrian and, as the incident developed, it included a forcible stop by
the police and their unconsented-to frisk of the pedestrian. The
case is now "seldom noted"45 because the Court ultimately dismissed it. But the Supreme Court regarded the case, as it was
pending during the October 1967 Term and in the four separate
opinions that ultimately were filed with its judgment of dismissal in June 1968, as closely connected to the other June 1968
decisions that we think of as the stop and frisk cases.46
The case began when Stephen R. Wainwright, a third-year
law student at Tulane University,47 walked in New Orleans's
French Quarter from his apartment to the night club where he
worked as a banjo player in October 1964.48 Two police officers
stopped Wainwright as he walked along Bourbon Street, apparently because he matched the description of a murder suspect
they were looking to arrest.4" In addition to having a physical
description of this murder suspect, the officers knew that he had
a "born to raise hell" tattoo on his left forearm," so they asked
Wainwright to remove his jacket to give them a look at his arms.
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1966).

"392 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
45 Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1267 (1990).
46 See, e.g., Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl
Warren, regarding Stop and Frisk Cases and Wainwright v. New Orleans (Mar. 12,
1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 623, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress) [hereinafter Dudley Memorandum, Mar. 12, 1968]. For a fuller discussion
of this memorandum, see infra note 431.
47 Mr. Wainwright later obtained his law degree from Tulane and was admitted
to the bar. Today he is a lawyer in private practice in Massachusetts.
48 See Telephone Interview with Stephen R. Wainwright (Oct. 8,
1998).
49 See Wainwright, 392 U.S. at 600 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
See id.
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Wainwright refused-possibly because, as a law student, he had
some sense that the Constitution limits police practices. He told
the police he would not allow himself "to be molested by a bunch
of cops ...on the street."5 The police then arrested Wainwright
on the "charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him."" As he
was being arrested on the street, Wainwright tried three times
to walk away "peacefully," to no avail. 3 Once he was inside the
police car, Wainwright called the officers "stupid cops," which led
later to an additional charge against him.54 At the police station,
Wainwright was booked on three vagrancy-related charges, interrogated about being a possible murder suspect, and was told
again to remove his jacket.5 5 Wainwright still refused to do it.
He scuffled with the police as they forcibly removed the jacket,
only to discover that he had no tattoo.56
Wainwright's trial commenced in December 1964. 57 After
lengthy adjournments, the trial was still ongoing when, in May
1965, the state brought three new charges against him for events
that allegedly occurred inside the police station.58 The "new
charges consisted of two counts of disturbing the peace by assaulting police officers, and one count of resisting an officer."59
The state then abandoned the first case and commenced a second
trial on the new charges. Wainwright was convicted on all three
of the new charges." On appeal, the court reversed his conviction for resisting but affirmed his assault convictions. 61 The
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wainwright's petitions for
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and held that
"[tihe ruling of the
Criminal District Court for the Parish of Or62
leans is correct."
5 Id.
52Id. at 601. Wainwright later was charged, based on this portion of his encounter with the police officers, with vagrancy by loitering. A charge of resisting arrest
was added later. See id.
5See id.
mSee id. Wainwright was charged, based on his oral comments during the arrest, with reviling the police. See id.
"See id.
"See id. at 601-02.
"7 See id. at 602.
"See id.
59Id.

6See id.
6'See id. at 602-03.
"New Orleans v. Wainwright, 184 So. 2d 23 (La. 1966), cert. dismissed, 392
U.S. 598 (1968).
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Wainwright petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on June 21, 1966.63 The petition asked the Court to resolve whether Wainwright's arrest and subsequent search were
lawful; whether he had a right under the Fourth Amendment to
resist the arrest; and whether the lack of evidentiary support on
behalf of his conviction constituted a denial of due process.' The
Court granted the petition on January 9, 1967,6 but the case
could not be scheduled for oral argument until the beginning of
the next Court Term, in October 1967.
2. Sibron v. New York
The second case to reach the Court raised so-called "frisk"
issues more directly than did Wainwright. Nelson Sibron's trip
to the Court began in March 1965,65 on Broadway in Brooklyn,
New York,67 a few blocks from the foot of the Brooklyn Bridge. A
New York City police officer, Anthony Martin, had been watching Sibron for about eight hours as he walked around Brooklyn,
conversing with people Martin knew to be drug addicts. 68
Around midnight, Officer Martin saw Sibron enter a restaurant.69 Martin followed him inside, interrupted Sibron as he was
enjoying pie and coffee, and asked him to "come outside."" On
the street, Office Martin told Sibron, "You know what I am after."71
Sibron "mumbled something and reached into his
"See Wainwright v. New Orleans, 35 U.S.L.W. 3029 (U.S. July 5, 1966) (No.
275).
rSee
Wainwright v. New Orleans, 35 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1966) (No.
275). Wainwright's petition presented four questions to the Court:
(1) Must person who is stopped on sidewalk "on suspicion" and questioned
by police answer all questions, and, if he has no identification, can police
lawfully compel him to strip to his undershirt and inspect him for identifying marks? (2) Did police have probable cause to arrest defendant without
warrant? (3) Did police officers' use of force to remove suspect's clothing after he refused to do so because he had unsightly skin disease constitute
unreasonable search which suspect, who was not permitted to call counsel
to prove his identity, had right to resist? (4) Was conviction so lacking in
evidentiary support as to constitute denial of due process?
Id.
,See Wainwright v. New Orleans, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967), cert. dismissed, 392
U.S. 598 (1968).
6'See New York v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
6See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 45 (1968).
"See Sibron, 219 N.E.2d at 196.
69See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45.
70 Id.
71

Id.
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pocket." 72 Officer Martin simultaneously thrust his hand into
that same pocket. He found and seized several glassine envelopes that turned out to contain heroin, and he arrested Sibron
for drug possession.73
The trial court denied Sibron's motion to suppress the heroin, finding that Officer Martin had probable cause to search Sibron. 74 Sibron pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense for the
unlawful possession of narcotics but preserved his rights to appellate review."75 The appellate court affirmed the conviction
without opinion. 76 The New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated the case with another, then affirmed Sibron's conviction without opinion, over the dissenting opinions of two judges. 77
Because Sibron was claiming that New York's stop and frisk
statute, on its face, and as applied in Sibron's case, violated the
United States Constitution,"8 his case came to the Supreme
Court on October 6, 1966, as an appeal rather than as a petition
for a writ of certiorari. 79 At the Court's conference on March 10,
1967, all nine Justices voted to note probable jurisdiction in the
case.80 Three days later, the Court announced that it was
granting Sibron's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
72 id.
7

See id.

74See New York v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
75See id.

See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 47.
See id.
78See Sibron v. New York, 35 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1967) (No. 1139).
The appeal presented two questions to the Court:
(1) Does New York "stop and frisk" law authorize unreasonable searches
and seizures, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? (2) If
statute is not unconstitutional on its face, is it unconstitutional as applied
to authorize pre-arrest search and seizure of narcotics in situation where
there is no probable cause to arrest without warrant and make incidental
search?
Id.
78 See id. In 1966, and for many years thereafter, the Supreme Court was obligated by statute to review every case in which the highest court of a state "held that
a state statute did not violate the United States Constitution." ROBERT L. STERN ET
AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 88 (7th ed. 1993) (citing the former 28 U.S.C. §
1257(2)). This appellate docket imposed an "unwarranted drain" on the Court's resources. See id. at 89. In 1988, new legislation repealed much of the Supreme
Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 88-89; Robert L. Stern, Eugene
Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction,74 A.B.A. J.
66 (Dec. 1, 1988).
8 See Handwritten note of Justice Abe Fortas, on Memorandum by Daniel P.
Levitt, supra note 38 ("all 9 to note").
76
77
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noting probable jurisdiction and transferring the case to the appellate docket.8 '
3. Peters v. New York
The third "stop and frisk" case, which had been Sibron's
companion case in the New York Court of Appeals, arose from an2
incident in a Mount Vernon, New York, apartment complex.
Early in the afternoon of July 10, 1964, Samuel Lasky, an offduty New York City police officer, had just finished showering
and was toweling off when he heard a noise at his door.83 Lasky
attempted to investigate, but was distracted when his telephone
rang.' A few moments later, he looked through the peephole in
his door and saw "two men tiptoeing.., toward the stairway."
Lasky called the police immediately and then returned to the
peep-hole, where he saw the men still tiptoeing away.88 Lasky,
who had lived in the building for twelve years, knew that the two
men were not tenants. 7 Believing that the two men had attempted a burglary, 8 Lasky decided to pursue them. He left his
sixth floor apartment and slammed the door behind him.89 This
startled the men, who fled down the stairs. 0 With his service
revolver in hand, Lasky chased them.9 '
Between the fifth and fourth floors, Lasky "collared" a man
named John Francis Peters.92 Lasky asked him what he was
doing in the building and Peters responded that he was looking
for his girlfriend.93 When Lasky asked the woman's name, Peters responded that she was a married woman and declined to
identify her.94 Lasky then frisked Peters, looking for a weapon."
81 See

Sibron v. New York, 386 U.S. 954 (1967).

See People v. Peters, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (County Ct. 1964), affd, 265
N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1965), affd, 219 N.E.2d 595 (N.Y. 1966); affd, sub nom., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 48 (1968).
8See
See id.

8Id.
See id.
7See id.
83 See id.
See id. at 49.
See id.
91 See id. at 49 n.7 (quoting from Officer Lasky's testimony at the suppression
hearing).
92 Id. at

49.

9 See id.
9See

id.
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Lasky felt something hard in Peters's pocket and thought it
might be a knife, so he removed it."5 The object turned out to be
a sealed opaque plastic envelope containing Allen wrenches and
lock picks.97
Peters was arrested and charged with felonious possession

of burglar's tools. 98 Before trial, the court denied Peters's motion
to suppress the tools that Lasky had seized from his pocket.9 9
Peters then pleaded guilty, but he preserved his right to seek
appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion.0 0 On
appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court affirmed Peters's conviction without opinion.'0 ' The New
York Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that the New York
"stop and frisk" statute was constitutional and the motion to
suppress had been properly denied.0 2
Peters filed his jurisdictional statement, which asked the
Supreme Court to resolve Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to New York's stop and frisk statute, on October 10,
1966.103 When the Justices considered the case in March 1967,
following their decision to note probable jurisdiction in Sibron,
they were not unanimous in seeing value to a second stop and
°
frisk appeal involving the New York statute.'O
Most Justices,
See id.
See id.
97 See Peters, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
11.
'8 See id. Under New York's law at the time, possession of burglar tools under
such circumstances was generally a misdemeanor, but it was a felony if committed
by anyone who previously had been convicted. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 408 (1909).
Therefore, Peters, who had been convicted previously, was charged with the felony
offense. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 48 n.5.
See Peters,254 N.Y.S.2d at 13, 14.
1"0See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 48.
101 See People v. Peters, 265 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1965), affd, 219 N.E.2d 595
'5

(N.Y. 1966), affd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
102 See People v. Peters, 219 N.E.2d 595, 600-01 (N.Y. 1966), affd, 392 U.S. 40
(1968).

103See Peters v. New York, 35 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1967) (No. 1192).
Peters's jurisdictional statement presented one question: "Does [the] New York 'stop
and frisk' law authorize unreasonable searches and seizures, in violation of Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments?" Id.
104 Justices' notes indicate that Justices Stewart and Fortas favored noting jurisdiction in Peters. See Handwritten note of Justice William 0. Douglas, on Memorandum by Lewis B. Merrifield, Law Clerk to Justice Douglas (Mar. 22, 1967)
(available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1418, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress) ("P.S. [Justice Potter Stewart] wants to hear this along with Sibron.");
Handwritten note of Justice Abe Fortas, on Memorandum by Lewis B. Merrifield,
Law Clerk to Justice Douglas, regarding Peters v. New York (available in Abe For-
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however, ultimately voted to note probable jurisdiction in the Peters case."' On March 20, 1967, the Court announced that it was
granting Peters's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
noting probable jurisdiction and transferring the case to the appellate docket.'
The Court set Peters for oral argument imme0 7
diately following Sibron.'
4. Terry v. Ohio
The final stop and frisk case to arrive at the Supreme Court
became the decision that, in the end, got top billing: Terry v.
Ohio.108

John W. Terry's legal troubles in this case began on a street
corner at Playhouse Square in downtown Cleveland, Ohio.'09 On
the afternoon of Thursday, October 31, 1963, a long-time Cleveland police department detective, Martin McFadden, observed
Terry and another man, Richard D. Chilton, behaving suspiciously near a busy street corner in Cleveland's downtown commercial district."0 McFadden observed Terry and Chilton for
about twelve minutes as each would take a turn walking several
hundred feet down the block, peering into the window of a jewand returning
the same
corner."
elry store
or time,
an airline
office,McFadden
man approach
this
detective
saw atothird
During

tas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) ("Note with Sibron.").
Chief Justice Warren, who later voted to deny review in Peters, initially favored
holding it pending the Court's decision in Sibron. See Handwritten note of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, on Memorandum by Conrad Douglas Kranwinkle, Law Clerk
to Chief Justice Warren (Mar. 16, 1967) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("Hold for Sibron").
105 Six or seven Justices voted to note probable jurisdiction
in Peters. See Typed
note stapled to Memorandum by Lewis B. Merrifield, Law Clerk to Justice Douglas

(Mar. 22, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1418, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) ("No. 74-Grant: Full Court escept [sic] Black and CJ
[Warren] voting to deny."); Handwritten note by unknown writer regarding Peters,
on Bench Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Law Clerk to Chief Justice Warren,
(Dec. 6, 1967) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Conress) ("all but 3.").
*6See Peters v. New York, 386 U.S. 980 (1967) (No. 846, Misc.).
107 See id.
10"392

U.S. 1 (1968).

109For a street map that depicts the Terry stops, frisks and arrests, see 72 ST.
JoHN's L. REv 1384-85 (1998).
10

See Ohio v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), affd, 392 U.S. 1

(1968).
. See id.
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the corner, speak briefly with the two men, and then depart. 112
Terry and Chilton soon left the corner and proceeded down the
adjacent street, where they met the third man.1 ' McFadden
then approached the three men, identified himself and asked for
their names."' After receiving a mumbled response, he "turned
[Terry] around, quickly 'patted down' the outside of his clothing,
and, perceiving a hard object in the inner breast pocket of his
topcoat, inserted his hand and removed a fully loaded automatic.""5 McFadden then frisked Chilton, finding a gun in the
pocket of his topcoat. Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons." 6 Their pretrial motions to suppress
the guns and the bullets they contained were denied and they
were convicted at separate bench trials."7 The Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions"8 and the Ohio Supreme Court
denied review."'
Terry and Chilton petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of
certiorari on March 18, 1967.120 Their joint petition asked the
Court to resolve whether the officer had, by frisking them, arrested them without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, requiring suppression of the gun
evidence. 12 Unlike Sibron and Peters, these Ohio cases came
from a jurisdiction with no statute authorizing police stops and
frisks. They also involved frisks that resulted in seizures of
handguns on a public street. 22 Although the Justices considered
See id.
See id.
114 See id.
112
113

115 Id.
116 See

id.
See id. For transcripts of the Terry and Chilton suppression hearing and trials, see Defendants' Bill of Exceptions, State v. Terry and State v. Chilton (Nos.
79,491 & 79,432), reprinted in Appendix, State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and
State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts,72
ST. JOHN'S L. REV 1387 (1998) [hereinafter Terry transcript].
See Terry, 214 N.E.2d at 122.
119 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
120 See Terry v. Ohio, 35 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1967) (No. 1161).
121See Terry v. Ohio, 35 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1967) (No. 1161). The petition presented one question to the Court: "Did [the] police officer's mid-afternoon
stopping and frisking of suspects constitute unlawful arrest without probable cause,
rendering evidence so obtained inadmissible under [the] Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments?" Id.
122 The unique facts of Terry and Chilton, and their implications
for future litigation, led the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to file a
brief as amicus curiae in support of the petitions for writs of certiorari and on the
117
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holding these cases pending the Sibron decision,' eight Justices
ultimately voted to grant review. 124 On May 29, 1967, the Court
announced that it had granted the petitions and set the case for
oral argument immediately following Sibron and Peters."
III. INITIAL APPROACHES TO THE STOP AND FRISK CASES
The Justices'Pre-Argument Considerationof the Cases
The interested legal community responded aggressively to
the Court's decisions to hear the stop and frisk cases during its
October 1967 Term. The parties filed extensive briefs on the
merits and, in addition, amicus curiae filed briefs with the
Court. The amici who advocated affirmance of Sibron's, Peters's,
and Terry's convictions, and, thus, were urging the Court to give
its constitutional imprimatur to police stops and frisks in the absence of probable cause to arrest included Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, an Illinois non-profit corporation; 126 the

A.

merits. See Letter from Bernard A. Berkman, Attorney at Law, Cleveland, OH, to
Melvin L. Wulf, Esq., ACLU National Office, New York City 1-2 (June 9, 1967)
(available in ACLU Papers, cont. 1731, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University):
You will note that [Terry] is the "purest" of the three "stop and frisk" cases,
inasmuch as it does not involve any statutory interpretation (Ohio has no
stop and frisk law), the trial court as trier of fact has specifically found no
valid arrest in advance of the "frisk," and the evidence seized from the person and introduced in evidence against the accused is the weapon for which
the cop was looking and not other evidence incidentally discovered. It will,
therefore, take a broader rule to reverse Terry than to reverse Sibron and
Peters.
Id.

123See, e.g.,

Handwritten note of Chief Justice Earl Warren, on Memorandum by
Conrad Douglas Kranwinkle, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Warren (May 22, 1967)
(available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("Hold
for Sibron[.] No statute involved[.] The Court used the standard of 'reasonably suspicion' for frisking.").
124 See Typed note stapled to Memorandum by Lewis B. Merrifield, Law
Clerk to
Justice Douglas (May 20, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("No. 67-Grant: Full Court except
Douglas, J. would hold.").
125 See Terry v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967). Following Chilton's death in June
1967, the Court granted Terry's motion to proceed further in forma pauperis and to
dispense with printing the record. Terry v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 804 (1967). Justice Marshall took no part in considering or deciding these motions. See id. In the end, the
only Ohio stop and frisk case that the Court decided was Terry's.
26

See Brief of Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, as Amicus Curiae,

Terry (No. 67) reprintedin 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
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Attorney General of the State of New York; 121 the National District Attorneys Association; 128 and, on behalf
of the United
29
States, Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold.
The Court also received a powerful amicus brief on the other
side of the issue from the national, New York, and Ohio offices of
the American Civil Liberties Union,'3 ° and a separate amicus
brief from the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. (LDF).131 The LDF's brief, written principally by Professor
Anthony Amsterdam, then a member of the University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty, argued that citizens need more protection from aggressive street police investigative tactics and
urged the Court to "hold that neither stops nor frisks may be
made without probable cause.'

32

Although Amsterdam's brief

did not emphasize the possibility that some police officers decide
which pedestrians to stop and frisk based on race, as opposed to
law enforcement considerations, the anti-discrimination objectives of all LDF litigation in the 1960s were no secret. LDF's involvement in the Terry litigation signaled that police stops and
frisks were matters of great concern to racial egalitarians
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499 (Philip B. Kurland &

Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. This brief was signed
by James R. Thompson, then the District Attorney of Cook County, Illinois.
127 See Brief of the Attorney General of the State of New York,
as Amicus Curiae, Terry (No. 67) reprintedin 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 126, at 531.
12s See Brief of National District Attorneys Association, as Amicus Curiae, Terry
(No. 67), reprintedin 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 126, at 647.
129 The Solicitor General's brief urged affirmances of the convictions
and argued
that the government should be able to seize and use any evidence it finds in the
course of a lawful frisk for concealed weapons. See Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
126, at 433, 454-55 ("If a frisk has been properly conducted and found to be legally
justifiable, the mere fact that the expectations of an officer seeking a dangerous
weapon were not realized, and that a suspect's covered pocket concealed some other
unlawfully possessed object, should not prevent the officer from removing what he
has found."). Justice Fortas was not impressed. In notes he made before the oral arguments, he wrote, "[the] US brief amicus is a fraud. Pp 17-18 would authorize
search & seizure of everything." Handwritten notes of Justice Abe Fortas, made before Oral Argument on Terry v. Ohio (No. 67) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale
University Library, Manuscript and Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Pre-Argument
Ter 7 Notes].
. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, as Amicus Curiae, Terry
(No. 67) reprintedin 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 126, at 457.
11 See Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 59-69, Terry (No. 67) reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
126, at 577.
132 Id. at 645.
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throughout the country.
After the LDF filed its amicus brief, it sought the Court's
permission to participate in the Sibron, Peters, and Terry oral
arguments, which the Court had scheduled together. The Court
was informed that Professor Amsterdam, whose work the Supreme Court knew well,133 would present the oral argument on
behalf of the LDF.'3 ' The LDF's motion stated that "because of
its long history representing Negroes-the allegedly prime vic-

tim of stop & frisk-it will provide assistance to the Court not
otherwise available."13 5 A law clerk to Chief Justice Warren
noted the LDF's assertion in its brief that "the power of the police on the basis of suspicion to interfere with an individual's
freedom of movement and right of privacy... [is] not uncon-

nected with the rioting which has plagued the Nation's cities in
recent years" and its statement in its motion "that its argument
will be on behalf of a usually voiceless majority-those individuals who are illegally stopped and frisked by police and then let go
because nothing incriminating is discovered." 36
It seems that the Court, when it considered the LDF's motion in November 1967, voted unanimously to grant Amsterdam's request for oral argument time.'
On November 13, 1967,
however, the Court issued an order denying the LDF's motion.'3 8
M' See

generally GREENBERG, supra note 26, at 444-51 (chronicling Amsterdam's
role in the LDF's anti-death penalty litigation in the 1960s and 1970s); EDWARD
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 90-98, 102-06, 112-14, 118, 131, 167-70, 189
(1998) (same, although portraying Amsterdam and the LDF's anti-death penalty
litigation more critically).
" See Note from William A. Reppy, Law Clerk to Justice Fortas (Nov. 8, 1967)
(available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1418, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress); Memorandum by Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Law Clerk to Chief Justice
Warren, regarding Sibron, Peters, & Terry 1 (Nov. 3, 1967) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
"' Note from William A. Reppy, supra note 134.
136
Memorandum by Charles H. Wilson, supra note 134, at 2-3. In his memorandum to Warren, the clerk stated his "feeling ...that these cases promise to be every
bit as significant as Gideon and Miranda"and urged the Chief Justice to grant the
motion. Id. at 3.
137 See Typed note ("No. 63-Grant: Full Court."), stapled to note
from William
A. Reppy, supra note 134; see also Handwritten note of Chief Justice Earl Warren
on Memorandum by Charles H. Wilson, supra note 134, at 2-3 ("Grant Motion to argue-30 minutes-ten minutes in each case to other side.").
"' See Peters v. New York, 389 U.S. 950 (1967). The order states that Justice
Marshall, who had been Director Counsel of the LDF prior to becoming a federal
appellate judge, did not take part in considering or deciding its motion to participate
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Although the Court papers that are available regarding the stop
and frisk cases do not explain the Court's apparent retreat from
its initial decision to grant the motion, it seems likely that the
Court wanted the stop and frisk cases to be understood generally
as police, but not as race, cases. Given the Court's internal
awareness of the LDFs claim that blacks were the primary objects of police stops and frisks and the connection between that
belief and urban rioting at the time, the Court, in denying LDF's
motion to participate in oral argument, may have been doing
what it could to prevent its own work from increasing societal
unrest. But it is striking nonetheless that the Court's June 1968
Terry opinion mentions the connection between stops and frisks
and ghetto unrest only in passing."9 The Terry opinion also does
not mention the race of any individual. A reader of the Court's
opinion will not learn that Terry was a case where a white police
officer saw two young black men on a public street, thought they
looked suspicious, kept watching them, followed them, and ultimately questioned and frisked them.
B.

The Wainwright Conference and Early Draft Opinions

On the first two days of the October 1967 Term, the Court
heard oral arguments in Wainwright v. New Orleans."' It was
the first of the Term's cases that arose out of police conduct toward a pedestrian on a public street that could be characterized,
at least at its commencement, as a non-arrest stop.'
The Court's conference on Friday, October 13, 1967, included
a full discussion of Wainwright.' The Justices voiced their frustrations with the factual record of the case."' Some found it

in the stop and frisk oral arguments. See id.
'39See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
140 See Wainwright v. New Orleans, 36 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1967) (No.
13) (Journal of Proceedings for Oct. 9 and 10, 1967).
...
Later the same week, the Court heard oral arguments in another case that
became a Fourth Amendment landmark. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (argued Oct. 17, 1967).
112 See Appendix A, infra p. 846, for a transcription of Justice Douglas's
and
Justice Fortas's Wainwright conference notes.
'4 Even during the conference, which of course followed full briefing and oral
argument, some Justices still appeared to be sorting out the facts of the case. See,
e.g., Handwritten notes of Justice William 0. Douglas from the Conference on
Wainwright v. New Orleans (Oct. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers,
cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Wainwright Notes] (Justice Brennan explaining, apparently to Chief Justice Warren, that

1998]

DECIDING THE STOPAND FRISK CASES

limited and imprecise."' Others realized that Wainwright did
not raise the issues they had believed the case implicated when
they voted to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.145 By the
end of the frustrated conference discussion, seven Justices voted
to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.'46 Justice Douglas
voted to dissent, however,4 so the Court's action had to await
his circulation of a dissenting opinion.
Douglas immediately set to work. One of his law clerks
drafted an extensive dissenting opinion."' After heavy editing by
Wainwright's "presence in [the] station house was [a] result of illegal arrest-his
May 14 trial was dismissed-then started (App B) the trial of assaulting the officer
in the station house").
'" Justice Harlan asked if the "amount of force he [Wainwright] used to resist
[the] police in jail [was] beyond the pale? he can't make out the answer on this record-record too opaque so he [Harlan] would dismiss or vacate + remand for findings on amount of force used." Id.
145 Warren, at the start of the conference discussion, "question[ed] whether [the]
case is properly here[,] for he [Wainwright] was found guilty only of assaulting officer in jail house-he [Warren] thought when we took the case that he [Wainwright]
was arrested and tried for vagrancy-what happened outside the jail-on that
ground he would reverse-but it looks like it [the petition] was improvidently
granted-no simple element of vagrancy or resisting arrest." Id.
...
See Handwritten notes of Justice Hugo L. Black from the conference on
Wainwright v. New Orleans (Oct. 13, 1967) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont.
398, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Black Wainwright
Notes]; Handwritten notes of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., from the Conference
on Wainwright v. New Orleans (Oct. 13, 1967) (available in William J. Brennan, Jr.
Papers, cont. 415, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Brennan
Wainwright Notes]. The seven Justices who voted to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted were, in order of seniority, Black, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart,
White, Fortas and Marshall. See id. Chief Justice Warren apparently did not cast a
definite vote in conference. See id. This seems consistent with his conference remarks. He had stated early in the conference discussion of Wainwright that "it looks
like it was improvidently granted." Douglas Wainwright Notes, supra note 143.
Later in the conference, after Harlan had mentioned the possibility of vacating the
judgment and remanding the case to Louisiana for factual findings, Chief Justice
Warren stated that he "would be willing to vacate for findings." Id. Only Douglas,
who voted to reverse, stated his willingness to decide the case. See Brennan Wainwright Notes.
147 See Douglas Wainwright Notes, supra note 143.
Douglas's own conference
notes record his view that Wainwright "was unconstitutionally in jail." Id.
1'8 The law clerk's typed draft dissent was twelve pages of text and an additional
fifteen pages of footnotes. See Justice Douglas's Law Clerk Dissenting Draft: Wainwright v. New Orleans (available in William 0. Douglas papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). After comprehensively reviewing the complicated factual record, the law clerk determined that because Wainwright's initial
arrest had been illegal, and thus unconstitutional, his later prosecution for resisting
that arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to use some minimal force to resist
an unconstitutional search. See id. at 10-11.
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Douglas,' his dissent was printed and circulated to the other
Justices on October 19, 1967.150
Justice Douglas's proposed opinion dissenting from the
Court's impending dismissal of Wainwright was a brief but powerful three pages. Douglas offered a detailed account of Wainwright's street encounter with the police officers in New Orleans,
his refusal to permit them to view his arms, his arrest and
transportation to a police station, the scuffle that ensued when
Wainwright resisted the officers' efforts to uncover his arms
forcibly, and the ultimate lodging of vagrancy charges against
him.15 '
Douglas then discussed what he saw as the patent unconstitutionality of Wainwright's arrest for vagrancy.' Douglas wrote
that the full record of the case "[did] not even approach establishing probable cause" for this arrest.'53 The arrest also had not
been made pursuant to an arrest warrant, nor had it been based
upon the officers' personal observations of Wainwright committing a crime.' He was not even guilty of loitering, because the
police saw Wainwright "standing still for only five to 10 seconds."'55 In Douglas's view, Wainwright's "arrest was no more
than arrest on suspicion, which of course is unconstitutional and

9 See id.
See Justice William O. Douglas, Dissenting Draft Opinion Circulated Oct. 19,
1967: Wainwright v. New Orleans (available in John M. Harlan Papers, cont. 298,
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
'0

'5'See id.
1'52See id. Justice Douglas, in other words, collapsed the question of whether
there was probable cause or some other constitutional basis for Wainwright's arrest
into a question of whether there was probable cause or some other constitutional
basis for Wainwright's arrest on the vagrancy charge that ultimately was filed
against him. This was inconsistent with Douglas's description of the Wainwright
case earlier in his proposed opinion as an arrest for questioning on suspicion of
murder, see id. at 2, and also with his statement that the police may have had probable cause to arrest Wainwright for murder. See id. at 3. It did however, permit
Douglas to address the "right to resist" question that interested him. Id.
1. Id. at 2. In connection with this point regarding the absence of probable
cause to arrest for vagrancy, Douglas noted that the Supreme Court had "remedied"
a "defect" in the record by obtaining the full records of Wainwright's two trials,
which had not been considered by the Louisiana appellate courts that had reviewed
his conviction. See id.
"5

See id.

s Id. In a biting tone, Douglas noted that Wainwright, "[to be sure... did not
have identification papers on him and 'very little funds.' But those factors obviously
could be ingredients of no crime under our present system of government." Id.
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robs the search of any color of legality."'56 Douglas thus saw the
case as implicating a citizen's right to offer some resistance to an
unconstitutional search of his person.'57 Douglas concluded his
proposed dissent by writing that the Justices "owe it to the police
and to the public to make clear in these troubled times what are
the limits of self-help against unconstitutional police action." 5 "
Douglas's proposed dissent had a tangible impact on the
Court, which had been poised to announce its dismissal of the
Wainwright petition, over Douglas's dissent, on Monday, October
23, 1967."59 Warren responded to Douglas that he might join his
dissent. 6 ° Harlan said he wanted time to think about it, 6 ' and
he ultimately asked Warren to hold the case over.16' Harlan then
circulated a proposed one-paragraph opinion." Although Harlan
"6Id. at 3 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)).
167See id. at
3.
168Id.
"9 See Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Mr. John Davis, Clerk
of the Court (Oct. 20, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
"0See id. In fact, when Warren later circulated his own proposed dissenting
opinion, it noted that Douglas was joining in that opinion. See Chief Justice Earl
Warren, Dissenting Draft Opinion Circulated Dec. 12, 1967: Wainwright v. New
Orleans (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and
Archives) [hereinafter Warren Dissenting Draft Circulated Dec. 12, 1967: Wainwright].
101 See Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Mr. John Davis, supra
note 159.
'2 See Typed note from Fay Aull, secretary to Justice Douglas (Oct. 20, 1967)
(available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
Justice Fortas, by contrast, apparently was not impressed by Douglas's proposed dissent. When the Douglas opinion circulated, Fortas's law clerk, H. David
Rosenbloom, sent it in to the Justice with the following note on its first page:
"Douglas dissent from dismissal of cert as improvidently granted-he contorts the
facts a bit and overstates the argument. No reason to join." See Justice Abe Fortas's
Copy of Douglas Dissent Draft Circulated Oct. 19, 1967: Wainwright (available in
Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives). Later the
same day, Fortas initialed and dated the opinion, writing only "Noted" at the top of
the page. See id. When Chief Justice Warren later circulated a proposed onesentence per curiam opinion dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, Fortas wrote back immediately to record his continuing agreement with
this disposition. See Note from Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Oct. 25, 1967) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives); see also Chief Justice Earl Warren, Per Curiam Opinion Circulated Oct. 24, 1967: Wainwright (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University
Library, Manuscripts & Archives) (with handwritten note "I agree AF).
163 See Justice John M. Harlan, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated Oct. 24,
1967: Wainwright v. New Orleans (available in John M. Harlan Papers, Seeley G.
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agreed with Douglas's identification of the ultimate "right to resist" issue,'6 he said he would concur in the Court's dismissal of
Wainwright's petition because the factual record was "too
opaque"
to adjudicate the lawfulness of Wainwright's resis65
tance. 1
In early December 1967, as the Court was preparing to hear
oral argument in Sibron, Peters, and Terry, Chief Justice Warren
prepared and circulated his own proposed Wainwright dissent. 6 '
Warren began, as Douglas had in the solo dissent he had circulated in late October, by reciting in detail the facts of Wainwright's arrest and search.6 7 Warren then concluded, based on
the factual record showing neither an arrest warrant nor probable cause to make an arrest, that Wainwright's arrest for loitering by vagrancy, and the search of his person that had flowed
from it, had been illegal." In Warren's view, it was "apparent
that the vagrancy charge.., was used as a pretext for holding
[Wainwright] for further questioning concerning a murder."'6 9
Warren said that
[tihe technique [the police] chose, using a minor and imaginary
charge to hold [Wainwright],... deserves unqualified condemnation. It is a technique which makes personal liberty and dignity contingent upon the whims of a police officer, and can serve
only to engender fear, resentment,
and disrespect of the police
17
in the populace which they serve. 0
Unlike Douglas's proposed dissenting opinion, however,
which had urged the Court to consider the parameters of a citizen's constitutional right to resist an illegal search or seizure,
Warren said the Court should decide only the illegality of the arMudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
164Id.
For reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of my Brother Douglas I agree
that the dispositive federal issue in this case is whether the petitioner used
an unreasonable amount of force in resisting what on this record must be
regarded as an illegal attempt by the police to search his person.

Id.

16s See id.
16 See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Dissenting Draft Opinion Circulated Dec. 12,
1967: Wainwright v. New Orleans (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University
Library, Manuscripts and Archives) [hereinafter Warren Dissenting Draft Circulated Dec. 12, 1967: Wainwright].
167

See id. at 1-5.

"8 Id. at 6-7.
169
170

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
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rest and remand the "right to resist" issue to the Louisiana
courts.' 7 '

Justice Fortas joined the Wainwright fray in December
1967. Justice Fortas, working from a law clerk's draft, circulated
a short proposed opinion concurring in the dismissal of Wainwright.'72 After stating his view that the factual record was inadequate and that it could not accurately be augmented on remand, Fortas took issue in two respects with the proposed
individual opinions that had been circulated previously.' 7' First,
in response to Justice Harlan, Fortas wrote that he was unwilling to state categorically that the police arresting and attempting to search a person is unlawful "where the arrested person
produces no identification, attempts three times to walk away,
and refuses to dispel any doubt by showing that his forearm is
not tattooed." 74 Second, in response to Justice Douglas's brief
statements that citizens may use force in some circumstances to
resist unlawful police conduct, Fortas urged the Court not to encourage a belief that police may not seek to identify pedestrians

171See id. at 6-7. Douglas recognized that Warren's proposed opinion, which
he
was joining, required him to make some modifications in his own proposed opinion.
On December 12, 1967, Douglas sent his law clerk a note during oral argumentalmost surely the oral argument in Sibron, Peters or Terry-instructing him to attempt such revisions. See Typed note from Carl J. Kim Seneker II, Law Clerk to
Justice Douglas (Dec. 12, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("Since you joined his [Warren's] opinion,
the introduction to your opinion requires a change, as you indicated in your note
from the bench."). Over the next few weeks, each of Douglas's two law clerks drafted
minor modifications and inserts to his Wainwright opinion, and he accepted some of
their suggestions. See William 0. Douglas Papers, container 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, for the sequence of proposed revised opinions. Douglas
ultimately decided not to join Warrens opinion. See Memorandum from Fay Aull,
secretary to Justice Douglas, to Chief Justice Earl Warren (June 12, 1968) (available
in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 625, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
172 See Justice Abe Fortas, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated Dec. 26, 1967:
Wainwright v. New Orleans (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Concurring Draft Circulated
Dec. 26, 1967: Wainwright]. This initial Fortas circulation, which Justice Marshall
joined after it had been revised slightly, see Typed note from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Abe Fortas (Jan. 18, 1968) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale
University Library, Manuscripts & Archives), is substantially the same as the concurring opinion Justice Fortas filed when the Court dismissed the case six months
later, see Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 598-600 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
173 See Fortas Concurring Draft Circulated Dec. 26, 1967: Wainwright at 1.
174 Id.
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who they have detained lawfully.'75 Fortas wrote, using some of
his clerk's most colorful language, that he "[did] not believe that
this Court would or should, without careful analysis, endorse the
right of a pedestrian accosted by the police, even under a mistake of law, to punch the policeman in the nose, kick him in the
shins, or bite him."176
C.

The Court's December 1967 Conference

The Supreme Court scheduled the Sibron, Peters, and Terry
oral arguments, in that order, as part of a cluster of thirteen
cases that would be argued during the weeks of December 4 and
11, 1967.171 Although there is very little documentation of each
Justice's preparation to hear these oral arguments, Justice Fortas did preserve a page of short "Pre Argument" handwritten
notes that reflect his careful reading of the briefs and his good
instincts for recognizing the issues that most of his colleagues
would come to see as the core concerns in the cases.'7 8
On December 11 and 12, 1967, the Supreme Court heard
nine attorneys argue for more than the scheduled four hours in
See id. at 2.
Id.
177 See Hearings Scheduled, 36 U.S.L.W. 3232 (Dec. 5, 1967). Unlike today's
176
176

Court, which generally schedules cases for oral argument on specified days for defined blocks of time and then sticks to that schedule, the 1967 Court announced only
the sequences in which cases would be argued and how long each argument was
scheduled to last. In practice, this meant that counsel often had to be present and
ready to argue on days when the Court fell behind schedule and did not get to hear
argument in the later cases.
178 See Fortas Pre-Argument Terry Notes, supra note 129. Regarding Sibron,
Fortas wrote that he intended, based on his reading of the briefs, to vote to "Reverse
(as Dist Atty concedes) because this is search-not frisk." Id. Fortas was less certain
about how to vote going into the Peters oral argument, because he saw "[ambiguity
as to whether this was a frisk-Maybe remand under our opinion." Id. Regarding
Terry, Fortas wrote that he "would affirm this one-It is [a] stop on reasonably
suspicious conduct, frisk-discovery of weapon & prosecution for weapon concealment." Id.
Justice Fortas also made and then preserved a page of handwritten notes during each of the three oral arguments. See Handwritten pages headed "63--Sibron v
N.Y.," "#74" and "67-Terry v Ohio," (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives). These pages are Fortas's notes of selected
arguments by counsel, not his own reflections on the cases. See id. The only other
Justice who made notes during the oral arguments, that now are available, was
Justice Harlan. His only note was "[c]ase is moot" written during the Sibron oral
argument. Handwritten note of Justice John M. Harlan, made during Oral Argument on Sibron v. New York (No. 63) (available in John M. Harlan Papers, cont.
305, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
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the three "stop and frisk" cases. 9 The Sibron argument began
on Monday, December 11, but the Court recessed for the day before the argument was completed.8 ° On Tuesday, December 12,
the Court heard the remainder of the oral argument in Sibron'88 '2
and then the complete oral arguments in Peters and in Terry.1
The other Justices' active questioning during the oral arguments
and their comments during the Court's conference later that
week establish that they too were well-prepared to decide these
significant cases.
The Court then met to consider numerous pending matters
on Wednesday, December 13, 1967, rather than on its customary
conference day of Friday. The December 13th conference, which
of course included no one but the nine Justices, lasted more than
four full hours." During this time, the Justices voted on ten jurisdictional statements in docketed appeals, twenty-one petitions
for writs of certiorari, eleven motions in pending matters, and
eight petitions seeking rehearing in decided matters."
They
179 See

36 U.S.L.W. 3245-49 (Dec. 19, 1967) (summarizing and quoting from the

oral arguments in Sibron, Peters and Terry); 36 U.S.L.W. 3252 (Dec. 19, 1967)
(identifying the attorneys who argued in each of the cases).
180 See Supreme Court Hearing List for the Session Beginning December 4, 1967
at 7 (including handwritten notes indicating that Sibron was argued on both December 11 and 12) (available in Thurgood Marshall Papers, cont. 40, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress). The first day's arguments in Sibron were made by
two counsel for appellant Sibron and, on behalf of appellee, by a prosecutor from the
Office of the District Attorney for King's County, New York. See J. SUP. CT., Dec. 11
& 12, 1967, at 200 (available in Thurgood Marshall Papers, cont. 40., Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
181 See J. SUP. CT., supra note 180, at 200-01. The second day, arguments in Sibron were made by the deputy chief of appeals from the Office of the District Attorney for New York County, as amicus curiae on behalf of appellee, and in rebuttal by
one of Sibron's attorneys. See id.
182 See id. Although audiotapes or transcripts of the Sibron and Peters oral arguments have not been published, an audiotape of the Terry v. Ohio oral arguments
is available on the Internet. See The Oyez Project: U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia
Database (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://oyez.nwu.edu/cases/cases.cgi?command=
show&case_id=378> (containing a digital audio (RealAudio) version of the Terry oral
argument); cf. 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 126, at 693, 706-07 (containing an
imperfect transcript of the oral argument).
18 See Calendar of the Chief Justice (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in Earl Warren
Papers, cont. 35, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (showing that conference lasted from 2:30-6:30 p.m.); see also ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE & MRS.
BLACK THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK 180-81 (1986) (diary
entry regarding the length of the Court's December 13, 1967, conference).
'" See Tally Sheet of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. from the Conference on
Dec. 13, 1967 (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, cont. 164, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Brennan Tally Sheet].
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also voted on ten cases, including the four stop and frisk cases,
that had been briefed, argued, and submitted for decision."
The Justices apparently discussed the four stop and frisk
cases in the order in which they had been argued. In Wainwright, the Court voted again to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted. In Sibron, the Justices voted eight to one to reverse the conviction. In Peters and Terry, the Justices voted
unanimously to affirm the respective criminal convictions.'86
Based upon the handwritten notes that Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Fortas created during the conference, preserved
and later made available to researchers, it is possible to recreate
much of the Justices' private discussions regarding these cases.187
1. Wainwright
The stop and frisk portion of the Court's December 13, 1967,
conference seems to have begun with a renewed, but apparently
a very brief," discussion of Wainwright v. New Orleans. The
Justices reaffirmed their conference decision of October 13, 1967,
to dismiss Wainwright's petition for a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted,'89 but they also agreed, now that the other
'' See id. at 6.
' See id.
'7 The Appendices

to this article contain my transcriptions of the conference
notes of Justices Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Harlan and Marshall appear not to have created and/or not to have preserved conference notes on the stop and frisk cases. Justice Black probably did take notes
during the Court's conference on the stop and frisk cases, but shortly before his
death in September 1971 he ordered the destruction of all of his conference notes.
See Memorandum from Justice Hugo L. Black to Mrs. Lamb, secretary to Justice
Black (undated) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 63, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress) (instructing his secretary to burn his conference notes); Handwritten notes by Frances Lamb, secretary to Justice Black, on Letter from Julius
Paul to Mr. John F. Davis, Clerk of the Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 1972) (available in
Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 63, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("He
[Black] sent me a personal note from his hospital bed even before retirement, to destroy what we had discussed."). See generally BLACK, supra note 183, at 276
(describing the paper burning that Black's family called "Operation-Frustrate-theHistorians" from the diary entry for September 11, 1971). The papers of Justices
Stewart and White, including any conference notes that they may have made and
preserved, are not currently available to researchers. See supra note 11.
'8 Based upon the complete absence of notes of any substantive discussion, I
conclude that the December 13 Wainwright discussion was very brief. For example,
Justice Douglas's page for conference notes, typed with the Wainwright case caption
and the December 13, 1967 conference date, is completely blank (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
1" See Handwritten note of Justice Hugo L. Black on the Conference List for
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stop and frisk cases had been argued, to hold Wainwright until
they were decided.1 90
2. Sibron
Following their brief consideration of Wainwright, the Justices seem to have turned to Sibron, which was the first of the
stop and frisk cases that had been newly argued. The Justices
had little to say about the so-called stop and frisk in that case.
Each Justice agreed that Officer Martin's conduct toward Sibron
had been unconstitutional. The Justices' discussion, and the
disagreement among some of them, focused on identifying the
correct procedure by which the Court should dispose of the case.
Chief Justice Warren led off the conference discussion of Si9 Although this appeal had asked the Court to decide the
bron."
constitutionality of New York's stop and frisk law,9 Warren
1 93
told his colleagues that he favored not reaching that question.
In Warren's view, the Sibron case did not raise a question of the
statute's constitutionality." Warren believed that Officer Martin's treatment of Sibron in the restaurant and on the street in
Brooklyn had not been the kind of stop and frisk that the New
York law purported to permit. It had been, instead, a "plain arrest" and a "search without probable cause." 95 Warren thus
voted to reverse Sibron's conviction.
Although a representative of the Brooklyn District Attor-

Dec. 13, 1967 (No. 3) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 398, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("Dismissed.").
" See Brennan Tally Sheet, supra note 184, at 6 ("Hold for stop & frisk.").
' In conference, the Chief Justice typically speaks and votes first, followed by
each Associate Justice in descending order of seniority. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, HOW IT IS289-90 (1987) (dispelling myth that
justices actually vote in reverse seniority order); see also EISLER,supra note 22, at
132-33 (describing a Court conference during the October 1956 Term).
12 See supra note 78.
'93 See Handwritten notes of Justice William 0. Douglas from the Conference on
Sibron v. New York (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont.
1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Sibron Notes].
"' Justice Douglas, whose conference notes are more copious than the available
notes of other Justices, recorded the Chief Justice's provocative but unelaborated
comment that Sibron "look[ed] like a manufacturedcase." Id.
'9'Handwritten notes of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. from the Conference on
Sibron v. New York (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers,
cont. 415, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Brennan Sibron
Notes]. At a later point in the conference, Justice Marshall called the police conduct
"a conditional arrest." Douglas Sibron Notes, supranote 193.
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ney's Office had "confessed" during oral argument that the New
York Court of Appeals had erred in finding that Officer Martin
had the required legal basis under New York's statute to stop
and frisk Sibron, Warren said he would not vote to dismiss the
case as moot or to remand it to let New York's Attorney General
confess
error in a lower court.'9 6 Warren favored reversing out197
right.
Justice Black, the senior Associate Justice, spoke next. Although Black agreed with Warren that Sibron had been searched
illegally, Black did not vote to reverse.'98 Based upon the prosecutor's oral argument, Black said that the conviction should be
vacated and the case remanded to the New York
Court of Ap199
peals for it to consider the "confession of error."
Justice Douglas, speaking next, focused on the different
remedies that Warren and Black were advocating. Douglas said
he was following Warren, 20 0 but he stated a refinement of the
Warren position. Douglas said he was voting to reverse, but he
advocated a remand solely to the New York Court of Appeals.2"'
Douglas seems to have been concerned to state with precision
that Sibron's case should not be remanded below the New York
Court of Appeals, which would have made retrial a possibility.
Justice Harlan spoke next. Although he agreed with Warren
that the police conduct in Sibron had been illegal,0 2 Harlan articulated a new view of the Court's proper response. Harlan did
not believe that the Court should credit the local prosecutor's
statement at oral argument that New York's highest court had
erred when it determined that Officer Martin's conduct fell
within the ambit of the state's stop and frisk law.0 3 In Harlan's
'96
See Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193 (Warren: "would not go on mootness-would not remand to let AG confess error below.").
197See id.
,98
See Handwritten notes of Justice Abe Fortas from the Conference on Sibron
v. New York (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Sibron Notes].
19

Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193.

200 See
20 See

peals").

202 See

Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note 198.
id. (Douglas: "Follow Chief-reverse but just to send back to Ct of ApDouglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193 (Harlan: "on merits he would agree

with CJ"); Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note 198 (Harlan: "If reached merits, would
agree with Chief).
203 See Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193 (Harlan: "can't take DA confession
of error against by Ct of A"); Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note 198 (Harlan:
"Wouldn't take DA's confession of error in face of highest court of state").
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view, rather, the case was moot 2" because Sibron had finished
serving his six month prison sentence before his case reached the
Supreme Court. Harlan thus voted to dismiss."5

The remaining Justices added little to the discussion. Justice Brennan said simply that he voted to reverse."' Justice
Stewart urged his colleague to "forget" the possibility of mootness and voted to reverse "on [the] merits."'
Justices White,
Fortas, and Marshall voted similarly."8
3. Peters
Following the discussion of Sibron, the conference turned to
Peters. Chief Justice Warren began by expressing his amazement that Officer Lasky's conduct-a police officer, armed with
his service revolver, draws his gun, chases two men through an
apartment building hallway and down a staircase, catches one,
questions him at gunpoint, pats the surface of his clothing and,
feeling something hard, reaches into his pocket to seize objects
that turned out to be burglar's tools-could be considered a "stop
and frisk."2"9 According to Warren, if this was a stop and frisk
then "anything can be."210 In Warren's view, Lasky's treatment
of Peters was plainly an arrest. It was nonetheless fully legal, in
Warren's view, because Lasky had, and acted upon, "probable
cause to believe [Peters and his colleague] were committing a
crime."" Warren said that the case thus was not an occasion for
the Court to consider the constitutionality of police conduct

...
See Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193; Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note
198.

...
See Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193; Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note
198. Harlan also said, apparently voicing his secondary preference for disposing of
Sibron, that he would vacate the conviction based upon the prosecutor's "confession
of error." Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193.
206 See Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193; Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note
198.
207 Douglas Sibron Notes, supra note 193.
208 See id.; Fortas Sibron Notes, supra note 198.
209 Handwritten notes of Justice William 0. Douglas from the Conference on Peters v. New York (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont.
1418, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Peters Notes].
210 Id.
211 Id.; accord Handwritten notes of Justice Abe Fortas from the Conference on
Peters v. New York, No. 74 (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale
University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Peters Notes]
(Warren: "He had probablecause").
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permitted by New York's stop and frisk law.212
Justice Black agreed with Warren that Peters's conviction
should be affirmed.2 13 Justice Douglas also voted to affirm, noting that Lasky had probable cause to believe that he had interrupted Peters's commission of a burglary.2 14
As he had in the conference discussion of Sibron, Justice
Harlan again took his own tack. Harlan said that the Court was
not free to find that Lasky had probable cause to seize Peters because the New York courts had not treated the case that way.2
Harlan told his colleagues that the legality of this conduct rested
on the New York stop and frisk statute.2 16 Harlan said that
Lasky's conduct would be "OK" if it conformed to the statute,2 17
but the available notes do not indicate that Harlan stated any
conclusion as to whether Lasky's conduct fit the statute.
The remaining Justices apparently had little interest in discussing the case further. Justice Brennan said that he was voting to affirm, leaving the details in Warren's hands.218 Justices
Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall simply stated their votes
to affirm.219
4. Terry
The Justices' notes suggest that, among the stop and frisk
cases they considered in conference on December 13, 1967, their
discussion of Terry filled the longest period of time.
Chief Justice Warren, beginning the discussion, viewed the
case as an instance of "question and frisk" rather than "stop and
frisk." Warren said that the issue in the case was whether Detective McFadden, the Cleveland police officer, had probable
cause at two moments in time: (1) when he first spoke to Terry
and Chilton on the downtown street; and (2) when McFadden
subsequently frisked them on the street and inside a downtown

212 See

Douglas Peters Notes, supra note 209.
See id.; Fortas Peters Notes, supra note 211.
214See Douglas Peters Notes, supra note 209 (Douglas:
213

[affirmsl-probable

cause for believing a burglary was under way").
215 See id. (Harlan: "can't find probable cause-NY courts did not treat it that
way").
216 See id.
217
218
219

Fortas Peters Notes, supra note 211 (Harlan: "ok if under stop + frisk").
See Douglas PetersNotes, supra note 209 (Brennan: "affirms in CJ's hands").
See id.; Fortas Peters Notes, supra note 211.
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store.22 Warren told his colleagues that, with regard to the first
moment (i.e., the approach to question), McFadden had probable
cause to investigate Terry and Chilton. Warren said that an officer who sees what McFadden saw has "a duty to pursue it,"
which means that he has to talk to the people he has been observing."
In making this point, Warren recognized that a
trained police officer may see things, and thus have probable
cause (and thus a duty) to take action, in a situation where an
"ordinary citizen" might not.2 2 Warren went on to say, however,
that people who are questioned by a police officer "don't have to
answer" the officer's inquiry, and they may even "walk away, " '
which would leave the officer with "no probable cause" to do anything further. 4
Regarding the second moment, the frisk, Warren said that
McFadden had probable cause "to fear he might be endangered."2 Warren stated that an officer in that situation "can
22 See Handwritten notes of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. from the Conference on Terry v. Ohio (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers,
cont. 415, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Brennan Terry
Notes] (Warren: "Did police officer have prob cause to talk to these + did he have
prob cause to believe his life was in danger"); Handwritten notes of Justice William
0. Douglas from the Conference on Terry v. Ohio (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Douglas Terry Notes] (Warren: "did police have 'probable cause' (1) to
talk to them (2) to think he was in danger of his life").
221 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
222 See Brennan Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Warren: "Having in mind that a
trained policeman may read it differently from [an] ordinary citizen").
222 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; accord Brennan Terry Notes, supra
note 220; Handwritten notes of Justice Abe Fortas from the Conference on Terry v.
Ohio (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library,
Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Terry Notes].
224 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
225 Id. Although Warren did not explain what, in his view, gave McFadden probable cause to fear that Terry, Chilton and Katz endangered the detective's safety,
Warren did state generally that a detainee's "actions" may give rise to this kind of
probable cause. See id. Warren also said that "a trained policeman may read" such
actions differently than would an "ordinary citizen." Brennan Terry Notes, supra
note 220.
In addition to his comments on danger-based frisks, Warren also told the conference that an officer may frisk "if there is a crime about to be committed." Douglas
Terry Notes, supra note 220. In context, the Chief Justice's statement seems to have
been connected to his view that an officer may frisk someone who he has stopped, if
the officer believes he is endangered by the detainee's presence. However, it does
not appear that Warren was asserting that an officer could frisk someone he had
stopped merely because the detainee had been, at the time of the stop, on the verge
of committing a criminal act.
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protect himself by seeing if they are armed."226
Based on his analyses of the approach and the frisk, and
notwithstanding Detective McFadden's conceded lack of probable
cause at either of those moments to make a constitutional arrest,
Warren stated that he was voting to affirm Terry's conviction.227
Warren's response to the analytical tension that might exist in
finding probable cause to frisk but not probable cause to arrest
was merely to urge his colleagues to adhere to the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement. Warren stated that
he opposed the idea that the Court "should disregard probable
cause" in determining the constitutionality of police stops and
frisks." He apparently did not, in other words, attempt to define that constitutional requirement in any of the operative contexts. Warren simply voiced his conclusion that McFadden had
probable cause to approach and to frisk Terry and Chilton. 29
Justice Black spoke next. He described McFadden's questioning-the moment when McFadden started "talking to" Terry,
Chilton, and a third man, Carl Katz2' 0 -as an appropriate exercise of the officer's right to investigate and interrogate people he
saw doing peculiar things. 23' Black said that because this kind of

226

2

228

Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
See id.
See id. (Warren: "affirms-he rests solely on 'probable cause'- would not dis-

regard probable cause"); Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223 (Warren: "Wouldn't put
it on any basis other than probablecause-not suspicion or reasonable grounds").
See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Warren: "There was probable cause
(1) to talk to the man [Terry] (2) to fear he [McFadden] might be endangered").
230Id.
23' See Brennan Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Black: "Does officer have [a] right
to interrogate people doing peculiar things? Don't know that this is forbidden by
anything in Const.").
Justice Marshall, who apparently spoke little during the Court's conference on
these cases, interrupted Justice Black's comments on Terry to challenge his view of
McFadden's dealings with Terry, Chilton and Katz. Marshall said that McFadden
had not gone up to the three men in Cleveland "to question them." Douglas Terry
Notes, supra note 220. Although Marshall apparently saw the police conduct as
more "stops to frisk" than as "stops to question," his conference vote to affirm and
his later decision to join Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion, suggest that his
remark in conference-that McFadden had not gone up to Terry, Chilton, and Katz
"to question them"-was a sardonic expression of doubt about what the officer's true
purpose was. My guess that Marshall was wise-cracking is consistent with Douglas's
note of Marshal's remark. The way in which Douglas recorded the remark suggests
that Douglas was annoyed that the junior Associate Justice spoke out of turn. See
id. (drawing a circle around "TM interrupts to say that police did not go up to them
to question them").
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police conduct was not an "arrest, "n2 it did not raise any Fourth
Amendment issue. s3 Indeed, Black said that the police officer's
right to stop and question people on the street arose from a body
of common law, and thus did not implicate any constitutional
provisions at all. Black saw McFadden's frisks as simply an officer exercising his common law right to defend himself,' Black
thus concluded that any evidence obtained through a frisk would
be admissible in a criminal case.
Although Justice Black saw the Terry case during conference
as raising no constitutional issues, he recognized that a majority
of his Court colleagues believed otherwise. He therefore urged
that, in writing a majority opinion finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court should "stick by 'probable cause' "
rather than resorting to the New York statute's alternative rubric of "reasonable suspicion."" Looking ahead to issues that
courts would confront following a Terry affirmance, Black also
urged the Court not to suggest that an officer who properly has
started to question someone may not "make [the] guy stay" to
answer questions. 6 In Black's view, the police right to question
was also a stop power. It was a right to "delay" someone
"temporarily,"2 7 at least to the point of eliciting some intelligible
response. Black thus did not want "anything said [in the opinion] that police can't make [a] guy stay until he answers or he

212 Black

said that McFadden had arrested the men "only when he told them to

go into [the] store [and] put their hands on [the] wall." Fortas Terry Notes, supra
note 223; accord Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Brennan Terry Notes, supra
note 220.
See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supranote 223.
See Douglas Terry Notes, supranote 220.
"* See id. (Black: "agrees with CJ to stick by probable cause'-he [Black] would
construe reasonable suspicion in NY law to mean.., probable cause"); Brennan
Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Black: "Agree that should use 'probable cause' + not
reasonable suspicion.").
In his account of the Terry conference, Professor Bernard Schwartz claimed
that Justice Black urged the Court, in something of a non sequitur,to "use 'probable
cause' and 'reasonable suspicion.' " BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL
WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 686 (1983) (emphasis

added). Schwartz' account was based upon Justice Brennan's conference notes,
which he quoted from but did not identify. See generally id. at xi (referring to documents "made available upon a confidential basis"). The confusion regarding Justice
Black's conference position is explained by Schwartz' omission of the word "not" in
his transcription of the Brennan notes.
236 Brennan Terry Notes, supra note 220.
237 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note
220.
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stubbornly refuses. " "n
Justice Douglas spoke next, but only briefly. He agreed with
Warren and voted to affirm Terry's conviction.3 9
Justice Harlan, speaking next, expressed some misgivings
about the constitutionality of Detective McFadden's frisks of
Terry and the others. Harlan was concerned that the frisks had
occurred before there was probable cause to believe that a crime
was being committed. 2 ° He also disagreed with Black's view
that Terry and his companions had been properly stopped for
questioning, and that the frisks were merely an officer defending
himself during the questioning. 24' Notwithstanding these con24 2
cerns, however, Harlan said that, he too, was voting to affirm.
Justice Brennan, the next speaker in conference, also said
that he was voting to affirm. 3 Brennan stated that a police stop
of a person-whether to arrest, or to question, or to frisk-is a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 4 In his view, the police
thus may not make the stop unless they comply with the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement.24 5
Brennan then asked whether there was probable cause for
this stop. 6 His question apparently was a rhetorical one. Beyond the affirmative answer to this question that his vote to affirm implies, there is no record that he stated or explained his
answer to the question he posed. He did, however, list collateral
issues that should be mentioned in the Court's opinion.4
238 Brennan

Terry Notes, supra note 220.

229

See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.

240

See id. (Harlan: "frisking took place pretty early-cop can't do that i.e. frisk

without probable cause that a crime is committed").
241 See id. ("he [Harlan] does not look at this as a questioning case."). Harlan
may have been picking up on Marshall's earlier, similar statement. See supra note
231.
2142See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
213 See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
244

See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Brennan: "there is a seizure not for

purose of booking him for a crime but for purposes of frisking ").
245 See id.; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
246

See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.

247

According to the notes, Justice Brennan made four drafting suggestions: (1)

that the Court not address whether police may continue to detain someone who has
been stopped, frisked and found to be carrying "nothing," see Douglas Terry Notes,
supra note 220; (2) that the Court not address whether the government may use in
evidence "other things" (probably meaning non-weapons) that are found in a frisk,
see Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223; (3) that the Court should refer to its Mirandav. Arizona decision, see Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; and (4) that the
Court should say that a frisk is a permitted component of custodial detention. See
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789

Justice Stewart spoke next, and briefly. He said that, he
too, was voting to affirm Terry's conviction. 8 He also offered
some views about issues that the Court's opinion should avoid.249
Justice White spoke briefly. He said, he too, was voting to
affirm.25 He then said, connecting back to a topic that Justice
Black had raised earlier in the conference, that police
"questioning" is not an activity that is governed by the Fourth
Amendment. 1 White added, however, that the Fourth Amendment is involved in a "frisk or search. " 2
The newest Justices, Fortas and Marshall, spoke last. Each
said he was voting to affirm,253 which made the Terry decision
unanimous. Fortas addressed at some length the type of opinion
that he wanted the Court to issue. He called for "a precisely refined opinion[,] not a Miranda[-]type"opinion.' Fortas also said
that they were "writing a new kind of probable cause." " He
urged his colleagues to "go case by case. " "u Marshall agreed with
Fortas that the opinion should be "narrow" and "precise. " 7
To wrap up the conference discussion, Chief Justice Warren,
who was assigning himself to write the Court's opinions in Sibron, Peters, and Terry, 8 stated some of his own ideas about how
id.

Justice Stewart, who spoke immediately after Justice Brennan, made some of
the same suggestions. Stewart wanted the Court to avoid: (1) the question of a person's right to walk away from police questioning, see Fortas Terry Notes, supra note
223; cf. Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220 (Stewart: "would not say a citizen can
refuse to answer a cop"); and (2) the "case where the frisk turns up contraband"
rather than a weapon, Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
248See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220. Stewart did mention that a state is
free to impose "stricter standards" than the Fourth Amendments limits on police
stops and frisks. See id.
,9See supra note 247.
See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; cf. Fortas Terry Notes, supra note
223 (White: "policeman may ask question").
252 See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra
note 223.
See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
25 Id.
2'See id.For example, Fortas urged his colleagues to "leave untouched" in
Ter 7 the
of a police "round up type of frisk." Id.
Seeconstitutionality
Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223 (emphasis omitted).
Marshall also
suggested that the Court could state that it was McFadden's suspicion that Terry
and Chilton were about to rob a store, and not McFadden's desire to question them,
that justified his frisks of these men. See id. ("Marshall, J. I might put it on suspicion of heist-not that cop was going to talk to them-but was going to frisk them.").
2 See List of Opinion Assignments (Dec. 14, 1967) (available in Hugo L. Black
25

251See
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he would write Terry."9 Warren stated his intention to "write at
length."26° He said that he planned to explain that the police
power to stop and frisk stems from the Fourth Amendment261 and
that, accordingly, a state statute "can't enlarge a policeman's
rights" to stop and frisk.262 Warren said he would "use the case
to lay down hard rules for stop and frisk" practices.263
D. Observationson the Justices' Conference Discussions

Although the Justices' handwritten notes that are available
today are an incomplete, and thus imperfect, record of the conference discussions of the stop and frisk cases,2 the notes are informative. Their relative length and complete consistency with
each other indicates their reliability. The notes support the following observations about the conference discussions:
o Of the four stop and frisk cases that the Justices considered in their December 1967 conference, Terry was the only one
that sparked debate about central Fourth Amendment issues.

papers, cont. 398, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (showing that Sibron,
Peters and Terry were assigned to the Chief Justice).
29 Although the notes do not specify when Warren made the remarks about
opinion-drafting in the conference discussion of Terry, it seems unlikely that he
would have discussed the opinion he planned to write-an opinion approving the
constitutionality of McFadden's conduct-before he had heard that a majority of the
Court favored that outcome. Warren's remarks also seem, in context, to build upon
Justices Fortas's and Marshall's own comments, made late in the conference, about
the kind of opinion the Court should issue. The physical arrangements of both Justice Douglas's and Justice Fortas's notes of these remarks by Warren also suggest
that he made them at a point in the conference after he had completed his turn as
the first Justice to speak. See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220 ("CJ would use
the case to lay down hard rules for stop + frisk[;] statute can't enlarge a policeman's
right" is squeezed in, across the typed date and case name heading, above the rest of
his chronological notes of each Justice's comments during the conference); cf. Fortas
Terry Notes, supra note 223 (notes of Justices' statements made on printed sheets
with a labeled box for each Justice, four boxes per page; "Would write at length +
say rights of police stems from 4th amendment + not from a statute" is the final
note in the Warren box).
260 Fortas Terry Notes, supra note 223.
261 See id.
26 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220; accord Fortas Terry Notes, supra note
223 ("Would write at length + say rights of police stems from 4th amendment + not
from a statute.").
2'3 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
26 The Supreme Court should, like other public institutions, keep a permanent
record of deliberative meetings such as the Justices' conferences and, on a systematic basis after some appropriate period of time, make that fuller record available to
the public.
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Wainwright was still a case that the Justices were resolved not
to decide, and it could wait for decisions in the stop and frisk
cases that the Court would be deciding. Sibron raised some ancillary issues that divided the Justices in conference, but they
agreed that the police conduct at issue in the case was plainly
unconstitutional. Peters, at the other end of the spectrum, involved constitutional police conduct. But Terry raised a constellation of Fourth Amendment issues that the Justices saw very
differently.
* Notwithstanding these differences, the Court's vote to affirm Terry's conviction was, unlike the ultimate opinion of the
Court, unanimous. Justice Douglas, who in the end wrote a biting dissenting opinion, did not say much in the conference, but
he did state his agreement with the Chief Justice's view of the
case.
o The Court did not discuss clearly how Detective McFadden
approaching, detaining and questioning these men (what we today call the Terry "stop"), did or did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Were the stops "seizures" of these three persons?
Most of the Justices implied that the stops were seizures, for the
Justices discussed whether McFadden's reasons for stopping the
men amounted to "probable cause"-which is Fourth Amendment phraseology.
Only Justices Black and White spoke
squarely to the issue, however, and they said that the questioning did not raise Fourth Amendment issues.
* There was no serious debate about the constitutional
status of the frisks in the Terry case. They were, in the view of
each Justice, Fourth Amendment "searches."
* Under the Fourth Amendment as it applies to such stops
(seizures) and frisks (searches), what level of justification must a
police officer have for such conduct? In conference, the Justices
answered this question emphatically with a clarity that is not to
be found in the majority opinion that came six months later.
Their answer in conference was also stunningly at odds with
what we have come to understand, down through the decisions
that followed, as the "reasonable suspicion" holding of Terry.
The Justices' answer in conference was the language of the
Fourth Amendment itself-"probable cause."
• There is no record that any Justice mentioned that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and
seizures, or that the concept of reasonableness had any bearing
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on their analysis in conference of the constitutionality of Detective McFadden's conduct.
o Where was McFadden's probable cause for the questioning? In Chief Justice Warren's view, McFadden had probable
cause to "talk to" the men based on "what he saw," which Warren described as "a crime about to be committed." Both Marshall
and Harlan disputed this view of the facts. Marshall stated
flatly-and out of turn, in this conversation by order of seniority-that McFadden "did not go up to [the men] to question
them." Harlan voiced his agreement, saying he "d[id] not look at
this as a questioning case." In their views of the record, McFadden simply saw what he saw and then frisked the men.
o How may a person respond when an officer, with probable
cause to believe that a crime is about to be committed, stops him
or her to talk? Chief Justice Warren believed that, in the absence of some additional development that gives the officer probable cause to frisk or, going further, probable cause to arrest,
people "don't have to answer [and] they can walk away-[and] at
that point there would be no probable cause." Justice Black
disagreed strongly, although he also thought that this issue did
not need to be decided in Terry. Black said he would say affirmatively "this citizen can't just walk away [and] refuse to talk
to the police when questioned." Black said that he did not want
the Court to say "anything... that police can't make [a] guy stay
until he answers or he stubbornly refuses." Justice Brennan
said he would "reserve on questions of whether [a] fellow may
walk away." Justice Stewart also recommended that the Court
not say that "a citizen can refuse to answer a cop."
o Given the Court's view that the frisks McFadden conducted were Fourth Amendment searches, where was his probable cause for those actions? Warren said that McFadden had
"probable cause ... to fear that he might be endangered," but no
one recorded the Chiefs reason for reaching that conclusion.
Black said similarly that a "policeman has [the] right to defend
himself [and] to frisk them to save his life," but we do not know
how or why he applied that reasoning to this particular police
conduct. Harlan voiced his skepticism, stating that this "frisking
took place pretty early." Marshall, however, seemed less troubled in finding a constitutional justification for this piece of police activity. Marshall said he "might put it on suspicion of
heist," which apparently meant that the suspected robbers are
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likely to be armed.
* Notwithstanding the social context of the times, the obvious racial tension over street policing practices and the written
arguments of the LDF's amicus brief, there is no record that any
Justice mentioned race at any point in the conference.
IV. EFFORTS TO DECIDE THE CASES WITHIN THE "PROBABLE
CAUSE" FRAMEWORK

A. ChiefJustice Warren'sInitial ProposedOpinionsfor the
Court
1. The Drafting Process
In Chief Justice Warren's chambers, the lead responsibility
for drafting the Terry opinion, and also for drafting a combined
opinion in the Sibron and Peters cases, fell to law clerk Earl C.
Dudley, Jr. Although he had been hired by retired Justice
Stanley Reed, Dudley effectively was detailed to Warren's chambers and served265as the Chief Justice's law clerk during the October 1967 Term.

Dudley had worked for Warren on the stop and frisk cases
prior to the December 1967 oral arguments. Dudley wrote Warren an extensive bench memorandum that recommended rever266 On the
sals of the convictions in Sibron, Terry, and Peters.
days of the oral arguments, the Chief Justice scheduled special
meetings with Dudley to discuss the cases.267 At Warren's request, Dudley next wrote him a supplemental memorandum,
following the three oral arguments but before the Justices had
discussed the cases in conference, that summarized
the Court's
26
"present approach to the stop-and-frisk problem."

1

Following the Court's December 13, 1967, conference, Chief
265
266

16, at 276.
See Bench Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Law Clerk to Chief Justice
See BROWN, supra note

Warren, regarding Sibron, Terry, & Peters (Dec. 6, 1967) (available in Earl Warren

Papers, cont. 35, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
27 See Calendar of The Chief Justice (Dec. 11, 1967) (available in Earl Warren
Papers, cont. 35, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (showing a 4:30-5:00
p.m. meeting with "Mr. Dudley"); Calendar of The Chief Justice (Dec. 12, 1967)

(showing a 4:30 p.m. meeting with "Mr. Dudley").
263 Supplemental Bench Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to Chief
Justice Warren, regarding Sibron, Terry & Peters (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in Earl
Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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Justice Warren met with Dudley to discuss the opinion-writing
assignments.26 9 Warren described the Court's views and votes
and assigned Dudley to draft opinions for the Chiefs review.
Chief Justice Warren's strong preference was to decide the
stop and frisk cases by drafting a model statute that defined
proper police conduct in this area.270 Warren's personal preference, in other words, was for the Court to proceed in these cases
much as it had two Terms earlier in Miranda v. Arizona.27 ' Warren agreed to defer, however, to those who did not want the
Court to take a Miranda-style approach to the stop and frisk
problem.27 2 As a result, he was concerned that police would interpret a decision that did not spell out rules for proper stops
and frisks as Supreme Court license to stop people at will. His
response was to instruct his law clerk to draft an opinion that
avoided the "stop" question altogether. 27 Terry would be, as
Warren saw things, a decision that gave the Court's limited approval solely to Detective McFadden's frisks of the three men.
Dudley performed his assignments with dispatch. Before
the end of January 1968, Dudley gave Chief Justice Warren two
extensive proposed opinions that had been reviewed by his fellow
Warren clerks.274 One affirmed the conviction in Terry. The
other, treating the two New York cases together, reversed in Sibron and affirmed in Peters.
Chief Justice Warren then reviewed and edited the draft
opinions, aided by the input of his closest friend and colleague on
the Court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan focused his
efforts on the Terry draft, sending Warren a six-page typed letter
219

See Calendar of The Chief Justice (Dec. 14, 1967) (available in Earl Warren

Papers, cont. 35, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (showing an 11:00-11:30
a.m. meeting with "Mr. Dudley").
270See Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding Stop and Frisk Opinions 1 (Feb. 29, 1968) (available in Earl Warren
Papers, cont. 623, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Dudley
Memorandum, Feb. 29, 19681.
271 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Miranda
Court
decreed that a police officer must give specified warnings to a suspect in custody
and obtain his waiver of those rights before the officer lawfully could commence to
interrogate the suspect. See id. at 444-45.
2 See Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220, at 4; supra text accompanying note
254.
272See Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 29, 1968, supra note 270, at 1-2.
274See Letter from Charles H. Wilson, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren,
to Chief Justice Warren (Jan. 29, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 624,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).

1998]

DECIDING THE STOPAND FRISK CASES

containing his comments.275
Brennan's letter asked whether the draft reached and, if so,
whether it addressed sufficiently, the constitutionality of the
"stop" that preceded the Terry frisk. 276 Brennan quoted passages
in the draft opinion that said, more or less explicitly, that the
only issue being decided was the constitutionality of the frisk.
He urged Warren to evaluate whether the stops that preceded
the frisks were Fourth Amendment "seizures" and, if they were,
to determine whether they had been based upon probable
cause. 277 Brennan wrote that, in his view, the stops certainly had
been seizures, but they had been based upon probable cause because of the "circumstances" that McFadden observed prior to
making the stops.
In addition to this fundamental issue regarding the constitutionality of the stop, Justice Brennan offered his input to the
Chief Justice on a range of other issues. Brennan suggested that
Warren move from a footnote into the text the "very important

point" that police abuses of stops and frisks that are not followed
by criminal prosecutions cannot be remedied by judicial enforcement of the exclusionary rule.278 According to Brennan,
275 See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Jan. 30, 1968) (available in Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
276 See id. at 1-4. Justice Brennan wrote that he:
read the [draft] opinion as in effect not dealing at all with what for me is
the basic threshold question which must be answered before we reach the
"search" [i.e., the frisk] issue: was the "stop" for the purpose of requiring
petitioner to give an account of himself a "seizure" of the person consistent
with the Fourth Amendment? I think that in the circumstances of this case
it was both a "seizure" and a "seizure consistent with the amendment."...
My problem is that I don't read the opinion as providing the analysis which
justifies this conclusion.
Id. at 3-4.
277 Warren's draft opinion was consistent with the opinions expressed
by a majority of Justices in the Court's December 13, 1967 conference. The opinion stated
that the constitutionally-required justification for "searches" such as McFadden's
frisks of Terry, Chilton and Katz was probable cause, rather than some lesser level
ofjustification, such as reasonable suspicion. See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Earl Warren
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Justice Brennan was fully in accord with this view. See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice
Earl Warren, supra note 275, at 2. Indeed, Brennan's letter to Warren noted that
his draft opinion risked creating confusion on this point because it twice used the
phrase "reasonable grounds" as an inartful synonym for probable cause. See id.
278 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren,
supra note 275, at 5-6.
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"[niow that the Court is rejecting the extreme position that an
officer may stop a citizen only if he has probable cause to arrest
him, critics of polic[e] abuses ought to be told that they should
turn to other agencies of government for the cure."279
Brennan also suggested that the Court explicitly not decide
whether contraband that turned up in a proper frisk for weapons
would be admissible evidence. ° Additionally, Brennan urged
Warren to consider saying that police need not give someone who
they have "stopped" a Miranda warning, because a street stop is
not custodial detention,2 8 ' and to reserve the question 28of
2 how stop
and frisk doctrine would apply to motor vehicle stops.
Brennan accepted the basic framework of Warren's draft,
however, which identified "probable cause" as the constitutionally-required basis for police stops and frisks.su
2. The First Circulation of Terry
With the benefit of Justice Brennan's input, 28 Chief Justice
Warren modified his Terry draft opinion, had it printed and circulated it to the other Justices on February 9, 1968. 2 Warren's
proposed opinion was lengthy (twenty-seven pages) and, in
places, quite acerbic.8 6 It began with an extensive introductory
219

Id. at 5.

280 See

id. Justice Brennan wrote that, "[indeed, I think when the question has

to be answered I may conclude that contraband discovered in those circumstances [a
stop and frisk based upon probable cause] may not be admitted in evidence." Id.
281 Id. at 6.
212 See id.
See id. at 2. Justice Brennan wrote:
I fully agree that "probable cause" is the standard but I don't think in a
case like this we get to probable cause for the "search" until after we demonstrate that there was probable cause for the "seizure", that is, for the officer to stop the petitioner and require him to give an account of himself.

'3

Id.

21 Chief Justice Warren's typescript copy of the initial draft of the
Terry opinion
contains both his and Justice Brennan's handwritten changes. See Chief Justice
Earl Warren, Initial Draft Opinion: Terry v. Ohio (available in Earl Warren Papers,
cont. 624, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (containing Brennan's comments on pages 9 and 22 and Warren's changes on page 10).
2 See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Feb.
9,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress).
28 The passages below are indicative of Chief Justice Warren's
acerbic tone:
[T]he logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a "stop" and an
"arrest," and between a "frisk" and a "search"... introduces ... a highly
technical conceptualism which threatens to contribute to the very rigidity
which the proponents of this motion seek to avoid. Such labored and arti-
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review of the facts and procedural history of Terry's case."
Warren then reviewed the Fourth Amendment framework that
would be applied to the case. 8 In this section, Warren followed
Brennan's advice to discuss in the text the limits of the exclusionary rule as a remedy that can deter police violations of the
Constitution. 9 Warren then explained that a police stop of a
pedestrian is a "seizure," and a frisk that carefully explores the
outer surfaces of his clothing is a "search," that must, under the
Fourth Amendment, be reasonable."'
Turning to the question of what level of justification the police must have to undertake such actions, Warren wrote that the
constitutional requirement is probable cause, explicitly rejecting
the view that police only need a "reasonable suspicion."29 ' Warren then focused on the frisk, explaining that the probable cause
required to justify a search for weapons is probable cause to believe that someone is armed and dangerous, even though that
belief does not constitute probable cause to make an arrest.292
In its concluding sections, Warren's proposed opinion evaluficial distinctions can only wrap the judicial process in a semantic fog and
divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendmentthe reasonableness of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's
personal security.
Id. at 12.
The difficulty with the State's argument [that the police should be able to
stop and frisk a person upon reasonable suspicion] is that it is either
meaningless or unacceptable. If by this argument the State means to suggest that bits and pieces of information may be ranged along a quantitative
continuum, with "suspicion" and "probable cause" as identifiable points on
the scale, at which different constitutional consequences are called into
play, we reject it as an arid exercise in conceptual hairsplitting, which is
not likely either to shed light upon the Fourth Amendment or to contribute
to effective law enforcement.
Id. at 15.
217
288
288

See id. at 1-5.
See id. at 5-9.

See id. at 7-9. In connection with this point about the limited remedial power

of the exclusionary rule, Warren mentioned "[t]he wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain." Id. at 8; accord id. at 11-12 n.l1 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
183 (1967) (stating that stopping minority group members is "motivated by the officer's perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer")).
2

Id. at 9-14.

291Id. at 16 ("We would only multiply the difficulties [of applying the Fourth
Amendment to the concrete circumstances of particular cases] by adopting a new
standard, 'reasonable suspicion.' ").
292 See id. at 20.
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ated the nature and scope of Detective McFadden's conduct toward Terry, Chilton, and Katz. Warren wrote that McFadden's
observations of the men's activities on the street warranted further investigation, that McFadden had probable cause to believe
that they were armed and casing a store for robbery and that he
quite properly seized the defendants and searched them for
weapons."' His conduct was reasonable in scope, Warren wrote,
because he seized them based on probable cause, and294
because his
search was limited to searching the men for weapons.
3. The First Circulation of Sibron and Peters
On the same date that he circulated this proposed Terry
opinion, Chief Justice Warren also circulated a proposed opinion
that would decide both New York cases, Sibron and Peters, together. 95 It too was lengthy-eighteen pages. Warren's opinion
began by describing the New York stop and frisk law. 2 6 It then
reviewed the facts of the arrest, trial, and subsequent litigation
in each case. Warren noted, as he introduced the facts of Sibron,
that the government's basis for claiming that the heroin evidence
was admissible had shifted a few times during the case, and that
the New York stop and frisk statute had not been invoked as a
justification for the frisk until the appeal to the Supreme
Court. 97 Warren also mentioned the prosecutor's confession of
error to the Court,298 and the prosecutor's assertion at oral argument that the case was now moot because Sibron had already
served his full sentence and been released from custody. Warren's opinion rejected this mootness claim. 29 9 The opinion also

explained that the Court would not accept the advocate's attempted confession of error."' 0
The remainder of Warren's opinion addressed, in order, New
York's stop and frisk law, the Sibron case, and the Peters case.

214

See id. at 22-23.

See id. at 24-26.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 9,

295 See

1968: Sibron v. New York & Peters v. New York (available in Hugo L. Black Papers,
cont. 401, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Justice Black's
Copy of Warren Majority Draft Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Sibron & Peters].
See id. at 1.
27 See id. at 3-5 &
n.4.
2' See id. at 5-6 & n.5.
29 See id. at 5-7 n.5.
09See id. at 9-10.
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Regarding the New York law, Warren wrote that the Court
would not evaluate its facial constitutionality."0 ' He explained
that the Court was unable to determine the meaning of its
phrase "reasonable suspicion," and that the applications of the
law in these two cases demonstrated that its facial meaning was
particularly inaccessible.'
Instead, Warren wrote, the Court
would determine what police conduct the Fourth Amendment
permits. The label that a state places on such conduct is irrelevant to that inquiry. 3 '
Warren then turned to Sibron's particular case. The heroin
evidence was inadmissible, Warren wrote, because it had been
seized illegally. Sibron was not searched incident to a lawful arrest because Officer Martin never had probable cause to arrest
him."' Martin's inference that someone who talks to known drug
addicts is engaged in crime was, according to Warren, unreasonable and "unacceptable." 5 Warren also wrote that the frisk of
Sibron was illegal because Martin never had probable cause to
believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous.' Even if he had,
Warren wrote, the search Martin conducted (reaching into Sibron's pocket to find drugs) would have been impermissible because it was not a frisk for weapons."'
Warren wrote that Peters, in contrast to Sibron, had been
searched properly. Whatever its status under the New York law,
the search of Peters was fine constitutionally because Officer
Lasky had probable cause to arrest the men he observed in his
apartment hallway. 08 Lasky in fact arrested Peters before he
frisked him, and he conducted a frisk that was limited in
scope.'"" It thus was a proper search incident to arrest under the
Fourth Amendment."0

30' See

id. at 10-13.

3u See id. at 11-12 & n.7.
3 See id. at 12-13.
'" See id. at 13.
303 Id.
See id. at 14-15.
317 See id. at
15-16.
's See id. at 16.
39 See id. at 17. Warren's draft does not explain how or why "scope" would be a
relevant concern during a search of a person incident to a lawful arrest.
310 See id. at 16.
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4. Private Reactions of Justices Black and Fortas
Chief Justice Warren received comments, through his law
clerk, on specific aspects of the proposed opinions. Justice
Douglas had his clerk raise with Warren's clerk a concern about
the implications of one sentence in the Terry opinion.31' One of
Justice Marshall's clerks complained to Warren's clerk about 1the
2
accuracy of the Terry opinion's citation to an earlier decision.
Most Justices, however, apparently kept their more stinging
reactions to themselves, at least pending their own writing and
formal circulation of their views. For example, Justice Black's
copy of the Terry circulation contains his underlinings, drawn in
a quavery hand, on most pages of the opinion." 3 It also contains
his handwritten marginal notes, which mostly highlight key concepts alongside Warren's treatment of them, but also, in a few
spots, record Black's own tartly critical reactions to aspects of
the draft. Black's copy of Warren's Sibron opinion contains
fewer notations, 14 but it generally presages Black's effort to
write a separate opinion addressing the New York cases.
Justice Black's underlinings and marginal notations show
his disagreement with four aspects of Warren's Terry draft.
Black disagreed vehemently whenever Warren described the
Fourth Amendment as protecting personal privacy. 15 Black also
',"

See Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl War-

ren, regarding Stop & Frisk Opinions 3-4 (Feb. 20, 1968) (available in Earl Warren
Papers, cont. 623, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Dudley
Memorandum, Feb. 20, 1968]. Douglas was concerned that the opinion not undermine "the established doctrine" that a search incident to an arrest is not constitutionally proper unless all of the particular state's legal requirements were met,
"even if these are more stringent than the minimum standards of the [Fourth]
Amendment." Id. at 4. Dudley proposed, and Warren accepted, a minor wording
change to address this concern. See id. Douglas later sent Warren some additional
comments and suggested language for the Terry draft. See infra notes 367-72 and
accompanying text.
312 See Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 20, 1968, supra note 311, at 4-5.
31 See Justice Black's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 9,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Justice Black's Copy of Warren Majority
Draft Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Terry].
314 See Justice Black's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Circulated
Feb. 9, 1968:
Sibron & Peters,supra note 295.
3," See, e.g., Justice Black's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Circulated Feb. 9,
1968: Terry, supra note 313, at 5 (Black underlined "privacy" in Warren's text and
wrote a question mark in the margin; Black also wrote "But it does protect places"
next to Warren's quotation of the contrary statement in Katz v. United States); id. at
18 (Warren wrote: "Thus, the standard for any invasion of a person's reasonable ex-
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rejected Warren's view that a balancing process should be used
to determine when the Fourth Amendment restricts proposed
government conduct.31
Black also objected to Warren's endorsement of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations.31 And Black questioned Warren's statements that police practices were a source of discontent in minority communities.318
Justice Fortas also gave a very close reading to Warren's
Terry opinion. Fortas aggressively marked and wrote comments
throughout his copy of the Warren circulation.319 Fortas's comments suggest his puzzlement and disagreement with statements and phrases throughout the Warren opinion. Fortas objected particularly to Warren's references to statements in Katz
v. United States that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
where police activity has not infringed on a person's subjective
expectation of privacy.32 Fortas also noted his strong disagreepectations of privacy protected by the Amendment must be probable cause."; Black
underlined "person's reasonable expectations of privacy" and wrote, in one margin,
"X X Does not rest at all on 'a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.'" and, in
the other margin, "no"); id. at 23 (Warren mentioned "privacy or personal security";
Black underlined the phrase and wrote "The Fourth Amend refers to 'security' not
'privacy'" in the adjacent margin); id. at 24 (Black bracketed and wrote "no" next to
Warren's citation to Justice Fortas's concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden).
3'6 See id. at 6 (Warren wrote: "The determination of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment can only be made in particular cases, 'by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails'") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 527 (1967)). Black underlined part of Warren's text and
wrote "no" in one margin and "Effort to define unreasonable is futile" in the other.
Id. at 21. Black wrote "No" next to a virtually identical statement by Warren. Id.
317 See id. at 8 (Warren wrote: "This Court is committed
to the exclusionary rule
as an absolutely indispensable device in the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment,
without which the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words.' " (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961)); Black underlined "indispensable device" and "would be a 'mere form of
words'" and wrote "no not true" in the adjoining margin).
31'See id. (Black marked the passage and wrote a question mark next to Warren's mention of "wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain"); id. at 11
n.l1 (Black wrote "NO" next to Warrens statement that "'field interrogations are a
major source of friction between the police and minority groups' ") (quoting
PRESIDENT'S COMmIN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).

3'9 See Justice Abe Fortas's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Circulated
Feb. 9, 1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library,
Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Fortas Copy of Warren Majority Draft Circulated320Feb.
Terry].
See 9,id.1968:
at 5-6.
Next to the discussion of Katz, Fortas wrote, "Katz is really out
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ment with Warren's proposed statements about the limited value
of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for police conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 21
But Fortas's most central concerns about Warren's Terry
opinion pertained to the adequacy of his explanation of the probable cause that Detective McFadden possessed, and also the
adequacy of Warren's explanation of when a police officer constitutionally may frisk a person who he has stopped. On the first
page of Warren's opinion, Fortas noted these "Basic problems" as

follows:
(1) Where, in this case, is probable cause to believe Ps
[Petitioners Terry and Chilton] were armed or officer was in
danger[?]
(2) Is the theory here approved that where police have right to
stop + individual must respond, the police
may frisk-or does it
322
go beyond that-or stop short of it-[?]

In the margins at various points, Fortas formulated his own
answers to the "basic" questions he saw. Regarding probable
cause, Fortas wrote that:
There may be probable cause short of p.c. to arrest-ie where
there are observed or known to the police facts which a reasonable law enforcement officer would regard as indicating that the
person or persons have committed or may be in the course of
committing a crime or engaged in some part of the process of
criminal action (ie, casing a store, approaching a house with
tools of entry[1)].3
Fortas continued to believe, in other words, what he had
stated in conference: The Court needed to explain that the basis
for constitutional
stops and frisks was "a new kind of probable
,, 24
cause.

Regarding the circumstances in which police properly may
frisk a stopped person, Fortas wrote the following:
I think [the] rule should be ... Where police have a right to stop
a person and require him to answer satisfactorily or be arrested,

they may frisk. This does not cover the many cases where police
of focus here-because the [right here under discussion exists regardless of an
'expectation of privacy'. . . This doesn't fit. "Id.
321 See id. at 7-9 ("I don't understand this - + to the extent I do, I Disagree.").
"22
Id. at 1.
32 Id. at 10.
324 Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220.
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may (are privileged to) stop a person if 3the police identify themselves-but may not require an answer. 2

Fortas saw Terry as a case in the latter category, because
McFadden lacked probable cause to arrest. His frisks of Terry
and his companions nonetheless were proper, in Fortas's view,
because as the stop based on the "new" probable cause unfolded,
McFadden acquired a proper basis to frisk the men. 3"
There is no indication that Justice Fortas, who put so much
effort into reading and thinking critically about Warren's Terry
draft,3 27 ever communicated any of his comments to the Chief
Justice. In the end, Fortas simply joined Warren's majority

opinion in Terry. Unlike Black, who started drafting immediately and soon circulated his own proposed opinions, Fortas
chose not to write.
B. Justice Black Writes Separately
In the week following his receipt and close reading of Chief
Justice Warren's proposed opinions for the Court, Justice Black
wrote, in longhand, his own proposed opinions in Sibron and Peters together,3 28 and separately in Terry.329
Fortas's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Terry, supra
note 319, at 10.
2' See id. at 23 ("The reasonable cause was r.c. to stop these men and make inquiry. Their reactions then in the circumstances gave reason to search for weapons.").
Fortas also seemed to consider the argument, suggested by the penultimate
sentence of Warren's proposed opinion, that McFadden's belief that the men were
carrying concealed weapons gave him probable cause to do what he did (and more).
See id. at 27 ("If this is the case [that an investigative stop that does not dispel the
officer's safety concerns justifies his patting persons for weapons], why all the talkWhy not say he had reasonable cause to believe they were violating law by carrying
concealed weapons--").
327 Fortas's copy of Warren's proposed opinion in Sibron and Peters,by contrast,
contains almost no marks and no marginal comments. See Justice Abe Fortas's Copy
of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Sibron v. New York, Peters v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
228 See Justice Hugo L. Black, Handwritten Draft Opinion: Sibron v. New York,
Peters v. New York (Feb. 1968) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 401,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (concurring that Peters should be affirmed and dissenting from the reversal of Sibron); see also Typed version of Justice
Hugo L. Black's Draft Opinion: Sibron & Peters (Feb. 14, 1968) (available in Hugo L.
Black Papers, cont. 401, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Black Draft Opinion: Sibron & Peters].
229 See Justice Hugo L. Black, Handwritten Concurring
Draft Opinion: Terry v.
Ohio (Feb. 1968) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402, Manuscript Division,
325
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In the New York cases, after noting his agreement with the
Court's decision to affirm Peters's conviction, Justice Black's dissent from the reversal of Sibron's conviction emphasized his different view of the inferences to be drawn from the factual record.
In Black's view, Officer Martin's observations of Sibron talking
for eight hours to known drug addicts and his reaching into his
jacket pocket ("a pocket where weapons are known to be ha33 ) constituted probable cause to believe that he
bitually carried""
was armed and might use the weapon.33 ' Although Martin had
not stated this concern in his suppression hearing testimony,
Black noted that the officer's basis to believe that Sibron was
reaching for a weapon that he might use, unless it was taken
from him, had been the basis of the lower court decisions to admit the drug evidence.332 Black criticized the Supreme Court
majority for presuming, at its great distance from the trial atmosphere, to second guess these findings about Martin's unspoken inner thoughts. 3
This opinion, which Black circulated to his colleagues on
February 15, 1968,"' 4 is, with very minor editorial changes, the
separate opinion that he filed when the
35 Court announced its stop
and frisk decisions four months later.

In Terry, Justice Black used his heavy markings and marginal notations throughout his copy of Chief Justice Warren's
proposed majority opinion33 to draft his own proposed concurring
opinion. 37 Justice Black began his opinion by reciting some of
the facts regarding Detective McFadden's stops and frisks of
Terry and his companions. Black then noted his "agree[mentl
with the Court that under the circumstances [t]here the policeman had probable cause to believe that the men were armed, and
Library of Congress); see also Typed version of Justice Hugo L. Black's Concurring
Draft Opinion: Terry (Feb. 14, 1968) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Black Concurring Draft
Opinion: Terry].
"'o Black Draft Opinion: Sibron & Peters, supra note 328, at 4.
331 See id. at 3-6.
32

See id. at 3-4.

See id. at 5.
See Justice Hugo L. Black, Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 15, 1968: Sibron v.
New York & Peters v. New York (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 401,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
335 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 79 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
3" See supra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
37 See Black Concurring Draft Opinion: Terry, supra
note 329.
3
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that he did not violate the Fourth Amendment by making the
limited search of the men."3 8
Black then organized the remainder of his opinion to follow
the numbered sections of Warren's opinion.3 9 Black explained

his vehement disagreement with the Warren opinion's statements that the Fourth Amendment protects "privacy." ° Black
also disagreed with Warren's claims that determining the reasonableness of government conduct under the Fourth Amendment is a balancing process.34 ' Black also objected to Warren's
assertion that the exclusionary rule remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is rooted in the Constitution.342 Black agreed
with Warren's rejection of a "reasonable suspicion" as a constitutionally sufficient justification for some police conduct that
otherwise would violate the Fourth Amendment;3 3 in his view,

this concept should, like "privacy," not be grafted by the Court
onto the language of the Fourth Amendment.'
Although Black circulated his proposed Terry concurring
opinion on February 19, 1968,3 5 he ultimately did not file it.
338 Id.

33

at2.

See id.

340See id. at 2-4, 5-6, 8. Black wrote that "[tihe word 'privacy' is one of the
broadest words in the English language and there are certainly no words in the
Fourth Amendment that indicate a scope so broad as that." See id. "The judicial addition of the word 'privacy' to the words in the Fourth Amendment thus leaves the
courts freedom to expand it to mean infinitely more than the Framers could ever
have intended." Id. at 3. Black also pointed to three then-recent decisions, Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as exemplifying "what a tremendously
broad power this Court has given itself to hold laws unconstitutional by adding the
word 'privacy' to the language the Framers used" in the "searches and seizures"
clause of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
341 See id. at 4-5, 8.
342 See id. at 5.
m See id. at 6-7. Black wrote that he:
heartily agree[d] with the Court's refusal... to substitute the words
"reasonable suspicion" for the words "probable cause" or to add the words
"reasonable suspicion" to the words the Framers used. There is, of course,
no reason to use the "reasonable suspicion" term unless it means something more or something less than probable cause; if it does it would
change the meaning the Framers wrote into the [Fourth] Amendment,
thereby making a constitutional change courts are vested with no power to
make.
Id. at 6.
'"See id. at 6-7.
"5 See Justice Hugo L. Black, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 19,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
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When the Court announced its Terry decision in June 1968,
Black filed only a one sentence statement noting his concurrence
in the result and in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, "except
where the opinion quotes from and relies upon this Court's
opinion in Katz v. United States and the concurring opinion [of
34
Justice Fortas] in Warden v. Hayden."
C. Chief Justice Warren Recirculates
On February 21, 1968, the Chief Justice recirculated his
proposed Terry opinion.347 With two minor changes,348 it was
3 49
identical to the opinion he had circulated earlier in the month.
At the same time, Warren recirculated a proposed SiBlack's stop and frisk case files contain an interesting piece of correspondence
that he reviewed during this period of time. Almost a year earlier, Black had received a letter from an apparent stranger. After briefly describing three street disputes that had escalated into shootings in his hometown of Detroit, the writer
noted:
What appears obvious is that large numbers of assorted hoodlums are carrying weapons-carrying them without fear of being arrested-because
laws designed to safeguard our rights serve instead to protect and comfort
the potential killers.
In Detroit, as I am sure exists elsewhere, the majority of its residents live
in an atmosphere of fright. A massive hysteria exists. And yet, a "stop and
frisk" law can not be passed for fear the high court will rule it unconstitutional.
Letter from Bernard Edelman to Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 12, 1967) (available in
Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). When
he received the letter in April 1967, Black underlined the final two sentences quoted
above and instructed his secretary to " 'hold it for a while.' " Note from Frances
Lamb, secretary to Justice Hugo L. Black, to Justice Hugo L. Black, (Feb. 19, 1968)
(available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). In February 1968, Black's secretary gave the letter back to him with a cover
note. She "thought [he] might be interested in reading it again, in view of [his] dissenting opinion and concurring in the Sibron, Peters and Terry cases." Id. Black
then noted that she should "File" the letter. Id.
346 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
317 See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Recirculated Feb.
21,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
31 See id. The first change made was that the sentence that
had troubled Justice Douglas, see supra note 311, was now clarified. See id at 18. The other change
was the deletion of the citation which Justice Marshall's law clerk had objected to,
see supra note 312. See id at 20.
3'9 In the estimation of Warren's clerk, Justice Black's concurring opinion did
not require any response. See Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 20, 1968, supra note 311,
at 1 ("He does not challenge the reasoning of your opinion at any point, but merely
disagrees with the use of two words. I doubt that these points will persuade others."). Warren apparently agreed with this assessment.
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bron/Peters majority opinion.350 It reflected three changes from
Warren's original circulation in the case. First, Warren softened,
apparently at his own initiative, his claim that Sibron never
posed a danger to Officer Martin.351 Second, responding directly
to Justice Black's proposed dissent, Warren added a footnote
explaining that Martin's frisk of Sibron had not been made for
reasons of self-protection. 52 Third, in response to concerns about
Justice Brennan's adverse reaction to a footnote in the prior circulation, Warren deleted a statement that contraband and mere
evidence discovered during a properly limited self-protective
frisk would be admissible in evidence at the friskee's later
trial.353
D. Justice White's Broad View of the Stop
On February 21, 1968, Justice White circulated memoranda
that articulated his positions in the stop and frisk cases.3 4 In
""o See Chief Justice Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Recirculated Feb. 21, 1968:
Sibron v. New York, Peters v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Warren Majority Draft Recirculated Feb. 21, 1968: Sibron & Peters].
3' Compare id. at 4 n.4 ("Sibron, who never, so far as appears from the record,
offered any resistance.") with Warren Majority Draft Circulated Feb. 9, 1968: Sibron
& Peters, supra note 295, at 4 n.4 ("Sibron, whose behavior seems to have been
meek and submissive from the beginning.").
3,2 See Warren Majority Draft Recirculated Feb. 21, 1968: Sibron
& Peters, supra note 350, at 4, 15-16; see also Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to
Chief Justice Warren (Feb. 20, 1968), supra note 311, at 1 (obtaining Warren's approval for the new footnote "[t]o dispel th[e] illusion" created by Black's dissent that
the lower courts in Sibron "had made findings that the policeman had probable
cause to search Sibron for weapons in self-defense"); Handwritten note of Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Law Clerk to Justice Black, on Warren Majority Draft Recirculated Feb.
21, 1968: Sibron & Peters (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 401, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) ("Judge-The change at pp. 15-16 is a new footnote
which attempts to make a direct answer to your dissent."). In response to his law
clerk's note, Justice Black wrote "Change does not bother me" on top of his copy of
Warren's opinion. See id.
"' See Memorandum by Earl C. Dudley, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Feb. 20, 1968), supra note 311, at 3 ("[Ihe footnote is unnecessary to the decision,
and it may create some doubt about the limitations which the two opinions seek to
impose on the scope of these searches. Moreover, it may needlessly alienate Justice
Brennan, and create some problems for him should he seek to answer Justice Black
on the scope of the search problem."). Warren wrote "OK" in the margin next to, and
underlined, his law clerk's suggestion that he delete this footnote and "sav[e] the
question for another day." Id.
3'4 See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding No. 67, Terry v. Ohio (Feb. 21, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 624,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Letter from Justice Byron R. White to
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Terry, Justice White proposed to file a brief and somewhat cryptic concurring opinion that was, in his view, "not incompatible"
with the Court's opinion.355 White's draft opinion focused largely
on the stop. He discussed the frisk as an event that often will
properly accompany a lawful stop. 56
Justice White began his proposed Terry opinion by noting
that police always are free to question anyone on the street.3 57
People so questioned are free to walk away, however, unless the
police have a basis to detain them forcibly.358 The police have
this basis to detain someone forcibly, White wrote, when
"circumstances indicat[e] that the person approached may somehow be implicated with a crime."359 White called these circumstances "probable cause for temporary investigative detention,"
which "fall short of probable cause to arrest."36 Justice White
then announced that Terry was, in his view, a case where the
police officer had the "proper circumstances" to detain persons
forcibly for questioning,6 1 but White's short draft opinion in no
way identified or explained the facts he had in mind when he
reached that conclusion.
Justice White then turned to the frisk. He stated, but did
not explain why, it "seem[ed] likely to [him]" that in cases where
there are sufficient circumstances to stop someone forcibly,
"there also will be sufficient cause to search, without the necessity of pointing to further facts indicating that the person may be
armed and dangerous." 2 Applying this presumption to the
Terry case, White declared, again without explaining why, that it
was an instance where the same circumstances that "justified an
investigative seizure... also justified the frisk."363 He closed by
stating that it "seem[ed] to [him] that this would be true in most
cases, although it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where
Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding Nos. 63 & 74, Sibron & Peters (Feb. 21, 1968)
(available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 624, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
"' See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding No. 67, Terry v. Ohio, supra note 354, at 2.
6 See id. at 1-2.
37 See id. at 1.
3 See id.
359 Id.

s6 Id.
361 Id. at 2.
36 Id. at 1-2.
31 Id. at 2.

19981

DECIDINGTHE STOP AND FRISK CASES

809

it would be otherwise."3
In his letter to Chief Justice Warren regarding the New
York cases,365 Justice White separately articulated his view that
a frisk can be justified by the probable cause that justifies a stop
for questioning. White wrote that "[w]ith respect to Peters,... I
need not reach the question of whether or not there was probable
cause to arrest since in any event there was probable cause to
stop Peters for questioning and therefore to frisk him for weap-

ons."366 White again did not explain what it was about the justification for the stop that gave Officer Lasky sufficient basis to
frisk Peters. White simply declared the conclusion, and his intention to "probably write briefly along these lines."" 7
E. Justice Douglas Describesthe ProbableCause for the Terry
Stops and Frisks
On February 26, 1968, Justice Douglas sent the Chief Jus-

tice a short letter offering input on the proposed stop and frisk
opinions. 3 " Douglas wrote that he had "been spending a lot of
time" on Warren's proposed opinions.369 In Sibron, Douglas offered only "a few suggestions," which he regarded as "relatively
3' Id. White did not suggest any "circumstances where it would be otherwise."
Significant portions of this circulation became parts of Justice White's ultimate
opinion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
3 See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding Nos. 63 & 74, Sibron & Peters,supra note 354.
36 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. Justice White ultimately concurred in the result in Peters, filing a short
opinion that merely repeated his conclusion "there was probable cause to stop Peters for questioning and thus to frisk him for dangerous weapons." Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 69 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
Regarding Sibron, White's letter noted that he was joining Warren's opinion.
See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Earl Warren, regarding
Nos. 63 & 74, Sibron & Peters,supra note 354.
38 See Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Feb. 26, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 624, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress). Douglas's letter indicates that he and Warren had discussed
the stop and frisk cases by telephone a few days earlier. See id. Douglas's comments
to Warren undoubtedly drew upon the work of his law clerk William A. Reppy, who
reviewed Warren's latest Terry and Sibron circulations and drafted proposed
changes for Douglas to consider recommending to the Chief Justice. See Typed note
from William A. Reppy, Law Clerk to Justice William 0. Douglas, to Justice Douglas
(Feb. 25, 1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
'69Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra
note 368 ("As I told you the other day on the phone, I have been spending a lot of
time on your Terry, No. 67 and Sibron, No. 63.").
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minor." 7 ' In Terry, Douglas complimented Warren's "fine opinion" and offered two suggestions that would not, in Douglas's
view, "change [its] basic theme." 71
Douglas urged Warren, in essence, to clarify that Detective
McFadden had probable cause, based on his observation of incipient crime, to stop Terry; that McFadden was entitled to make
a self-protective frisk as part of that stop; and, subsequently,
that McFadden had probable cause, based on the frisk, to arrest
Terry for carrying a concealed weapon:
The first [suggestion] is that when the policeman saw these men
doing what they were doing, he had probable cause to believe
that a crime was in the making. Since he had probable cause,
he was therefore authorized not to make an arrest but to make
what might be called an investigative seizure, namely, temporary detention. But as you say, even a temporary detention
might be an extremely dangerous thing if the men were armed.
So he did have the right as an incident to that investigative seizure to pat down their pockets and coats to see if there were
guns. So far so good.
The validity of the arrest then comes into focus. Since he found
the guns he had probable cause to believe that another crime,
namely, carrying concealed weapons, had been committed and
therefore the arrests were justified. 2
Douglas's input is generally consistent with the views he expressed during the Court's Terry conference. It is inconsistent
with 73
the vehement dissenting opinion he ultimately filed in the
3
case.
F. Justice HarlanEndorses Stops, Including Self-Protective
Frisks, Based on "ReasonableSuspicion"
On February 27, 1968, Harlan circulated an opinion that he
previously had alerted his colleagues to expect.374 Harlan pro370Id. Douglas's letter does not specify what these Sibron suggestions were.
371

Id.

37 Id. Douglas's letter states that he gave back to Warren a photocopy of his

Terry circulation, with "attached riders that I think precisely express, without any
ambiguity, the ideas that I have in mind." Id.
374 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
On February 20, 1968, following Justice Black's circulation of his proposed
Terry opinion, Justice Harlan sent his own memorandum to the other Justices regarding the stop and frisk cases. See Memorandum from Justice John M. Harlan to
the Conference (Feb. 20, 1968) (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, cont.
17, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Harlan wrote that he soon would cir-
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posed to address the three cases in one opinion, concurring in the
results in Terry and Peters and dissenting in Sibron.375 His
opinion demonstrates his serious thought about the constitutional puzzles that the stop and frisk cases embodied, and also
his very close scrutiny of Chief Justice Warren's proposed opinions of the Court.
Justice Harlan began his proposed concurring opinion by describing Chief Justice Warren's failure to identify the legal basis
for the frisk of Terry and the subsequent seizure of his concealed
weapon.376 Harlan wrote that he could "think of three, and only
three, such bases" for a lawful frisk. 77 First, a frisk could properly be incident to a traditional arrest based on probable cause. 78
Because Harlan agreed with Warren's determination that Deculate a separate opinion concurring in the results (the affirmances of the convictions) in Terry and Peters and dissenting from the reversal of conviction in Sibron.
With regard to Sibron, Harlan specifically said that he was, unlike Black's position
in the proposed Sibron dissent he had just circulated, "voting to dismiss on the score
of mootness." Id.
375 See Justice John M. Harlan, Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry v.
Ohio, Sibron v. New York, and Peters v. New York (available in John M. Harlan Papers, cont. 305, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University)
[hereinafter Harlan Draft Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters].
Although the Harlan Papers do not clearly establish the process by which this
proposed opinion was drafted, it appears that a law clerk prepared an initial draft
for Justice Harlan, who reviewed it thoroughly and edited it comprehensively before
it was printed and circulated to the other Justices. The earliest available draft is a
typescript that contains Harlan's edits and, in at least one place, his written question to his law clerk about a factual assertion in the draft, and also the clerk's written answer back to Harlan. See Typescript, Stop and Frisk 25 (available in John M.
Harlan Papers, cont. 350, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
76See Harlan Draft Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters, supra
note 375, at 3. As he considered the stop and frisk cases during early 1968, Harlan
had focused increasingly on the constitutionality of police officers frisking pedestrians. Indeed, to facilitate his thinking about frisks, Harlan, in the presence of his law
clerk Louis R. Cohen, staged frisk demonstrations at his own home that involved
himself and his Mrs. Harlan. See Louis R. Cohen, A Biography of the Second Justice
Harlan, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1609, 1613 (1993) (reviewing TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT (1992)) (I
watched him think through the 'stop-and-frisk' cases of the 1967 Term when he
asked me (but really himself) what it would be like to be stopped and frisked in
various situations.") (footnote omitted); cf Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Harlan: Reflections of a Biographer,36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 223, 231-32 (1991) (quoting
Cohen's descriptions of other conversations he witnessed between Justice and Mrs.
Harlan, who suffered from Alzheimer's disease).
37 Harlan Draft Opinion Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters, supra
note 375, at 3.
378 See id. This is an "arrest includes frisk" theory of the frisk.
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tective McFadden lacked probable cause to arrest Terry, however, that basis for a lawful frisk was irrelevant to the case before the Court.379
A second basis for a lawful frisk, according to Harlan, would
be if it occurred pursuant to a state law that authorized police
officers to frisk
people to find concealed weapons 8 0 But such a
"prophylactic" 81 rationale for frisks would leave unanswered the
question whether such laws constitutionally could authorize police frisks on a lesser basis than the probable cause that is required for a constitutional arrest. 8 2 According to Harlan, if the

Court meant to approve such prophylactic approaches,8 3 it
should recognize that it also would be giving constitutional approval to frisks based on something less than probable cause.
Harlan wrote that he would agree with the Court taking such an
approach, but he urged the Court in that instance to attempt to
state the lesser quantity of justification for a lawful frisk.8 5
The third possible basis for a lawful frisk, according to Justice Harlan, would be a police officer's general right to protect
himself when making a lawful stop.38 8 But this rationale would

require the Court, in Harlan's view, to articulate the constitutionally-required basis on which police may make a "forced,
hostile" stop,38 7 for Harlan believed that it was such a stop that
3 8
necessarily entailed the officer making a self-protective frisk.
37 See id. ("[Tihe Court notes, properly, that there was no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything.").
80 See id. at 3-4 ("A State can certainly provide authority to search for and take
away concealed weapons, upon adequate grounds, without regard to suspicion of any
nonweapons offense, and without regard to circumstances indicating a particular
danger to the police officer himself."). This is a "stop to frisk" theory of the frisk.
81 Id. at 4.
38' See id. ("If a State made such a provision, the question would be whether,
consistent with the Constitution, the 'adequate grounds' would be identical with
'probable cause to arrest' for violation of a concealed-weapons law, or would be less
demanding in view of the urgent practicalities of street-corner law enforcement.").
"8' See id. at 4-5. As Harlan noted, the Ohio trial and appellate courts had not
based their approvals of McFadden's frisk of Terry on this prophylactic theory of the
constitutionally-permissible frisk. See id.
"3'

3-

See id. at 4.
See id.

3' See id. at 5. This is a "stop includes self-protective frisk" theory of the frisk.
Harlan noted that the Ohio courts had approved Detective McFadden's frisk of
Terry on this basis. See id.
's' Id. at 6.
388 See id. at 6-7 ("The real question, then, is the justification for a forced, hostile
stop. Since the stop necessarily entails a frisk, the grounds for it must be strong
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Harlan believed that Warren's proposed opinions skipped over
this question of the basis on which police could constitutionally
stop pedestrians.38 9
Harlan's proposed opinion then turned to the Peters case to
illustrate why he believed the Court needed to address, as Warren had not, the constitutionality of street "stops" by the police.
In Harlan's view, Peters plainly was not subjected to a search
incident to a lawful arrest because Lasky had no basis-i.e., no
probable cause-on which to base an arrest.3 0 Harlan wrote that
Warren was, by characterizing the Peters incident as an arrest,
"diluti[ng] ...the probable cause requirement... to avoid recof a special and lesser standard for stopping persons in
ognition
3 91
flight.
In Harlan's view, the real constitutional issue that the stop
and frisk cases raised was whether police officers may stop persons when the officers do not have probable cause to arrest them.
Harlan wrote that the Court had correctly answered that question in the affirmative, but it had not explained why or when
such stops were permitted by the Constitution.3 92 Harlan then
answered these questions directly. Although Harlan saw stops
as less intrusive than formal arrests, he also recognized that
they nonetheless are "seizures" that must be "reasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment.39 3 Because "probable cause" is the constitutional standard for a reasonable arrest, Harlan said the
Court should use different phraseology to define a reasonable
stop. His proposed standard was "reasonable suspicion."3 94
enough to warrant this multiple intrusion, but the grounds are grounds for stopping
and need not be logically related to the frisk.").
9 See id. at 7. Harlan wrote:
If this is the Court's theory, it is impossible to determine where the law
stands after today's opinions. The Court has declared that the stop of Terry
was not an "arrest"; that there was no probable cause to arrest him; but
that there were grounds to "stop" him, grounds the Court insists on referring to as "probable cause" but whose nature the Court does not explain.
Id.
390See id. at 7-8.
391Id. at
2

.11
"4

7.

See id. at 8.

See id. at 9-11.
Id. at 12. Harlan wrote:

In sum, I prefer to use the words "reasonable suspicion" to describe the
adequate grounds necessary to support a stop, in order to distinguish a
spade from a club and to avoid the overtones of neutrality, objectivity, and
probability that go with "probable cause" as a constitutional term. To dif-
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Much of the remainder of Harlan's proposed opinion was devoted to defining reasonable suspicion in operation, in the context of street stops. 95 Harlan wrote that a stop based on reasonable suspicion would be particularized to an individual. The stop
"should not be used for routine checking of pocketbooks and credentials, still less for harassment." ' Reasonable suspicion also

would support stops only in "fluid" situations where no alternative course of investigation was available to the police. 97 Reasonable suspicion also would be, according to Harlan, a quantity
of some real weight. He wrote that
circumstances should suggest to a prudent police officer a
"substantial possibility" that the person stopped is involved in a
past or intended crime. By substantial possibility I mean something less than a "probability," but something considerably more
than an "off chance." Circumstances must clearly and affirmatively suggest the involvement of a particular person in a particular crime.3'
Harlan also acknowledged, however, that judicial review afterthe-fact would often amount to a court accepting a police officer's
conclusory statement that circumstances had justified him in
making a street stop of a pedestrian. 9 9
Harlan believed that the central failing of the Chief Justice's
opinions was his effort to address police stops and frisks, which

ferentiate between the two kinds of police activity by using discrete terminology to describe the different constitutional standards applicable to each
seems to me to be but facing up to the realities of what we are doing today.
It will, I believe, create better understanding by the police of what is expected of them, and lead to a more orderly development of the law in this
new constitutional field than would imparting into the law a new concept
of "probable cause."
Id. at 12-13.
39"
See id. at 13-14. Harlan also argued, in a concluding section, that the Sibron
case was not justifiable because it was moot. See id. at 15-18.
396
Id. at 13.
397See id.
398Id.

39See id. at 14. Harlan wrote:
In a case such as the present, the trial court must necessarily base its decision upon acceptance or rejection of highly conclusory police statements,
for particular grounds for suspicion will be difficult to articulate. In this
case, the trial court, having Officer McFadden before it, chose to believe
that the totality of behavior of Terry and his companion suggested that
they were "casing." Nothing in the record indicates that the credence attached to the officer's statement was unwarranted.
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raised new constitutional problems, using the constitutional
rules that governed more intrusive and familiar police practices
such as arrests. 40 Harlan recognized, and was the first Justice
to explain at length in writing, that such efforts to use the
known Fourth Amendment language and categories in this context, although well-intended, in effect undercut their meaning.'
He thus advocated candor, and new constitutional approaches, to
address the stop and frisk problem.
Justice Harlan's circulation had varying impacts on his colleagues. Justice Fortas read it closely and marked it up thoroughly. 4 2 His notations indicate that although he agreed with°3
many of Harlan's criticisms of Warren's proposed opinions,1
Fortas disagreed strongly with Harlan's views of the cases themselves 4 and his endorsement of a "reasonable suspicion" stan400

See id. at 2. In a footnote, Harlan attributed much of this imprecision and

difficulty to the Warren Court's method of determining which provisions of the Bill
of Rights were incorporated against the States:
Before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, this whole "stop and frisk" problem,
largely if not exclusively a matter of state concern, would have been judged
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby obviating much of the difficulty encountered when the problem is viewed
against the specifics of the Fourth Amendment. The present cases afford
an example, I believe, of the shortcomings of the currently popular
"incorporation" doctrine.
Id. at 13 n.24. A draft of this proposed Harlan opinion suggests that this critique,
and an analysis of stops and frisks based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, initially played a more prominent role. See Typescript Stop and
Frisk, supra note 375, at 6 (crossed out language: "I prefer, therefore, to begin with
the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment divorced from the purely verbal
quagmire through which they are dragged by a rigid and negative 'incorporation' of
the Fourth Amendment.").
40' See Harlan Draft Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters, supra
note 375, at 2.
412 See Justice Abe Fortas's Copy of Justice Harlan's Draft Opinion
Circulated
Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters (available in Abe Fortas's Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives). Fortas's law clerk apparently read the
Harlan circulation first and made some notes on it to his boss. See, e.g., id. at 1
("This has some good criticisms of the Chiefs opinion-substantive and mootness.
The way Harlan would handle the problem is at least honest. But, as to its wisdom-?- PZ" [Peter Zimroth, law clerk to Justice Fortas]).
413 See, e.g., id. at 3 (Fortas noting "Terry would not comply with this" next to
Harlan's quote of Warren's statement that "the 'initial inquiry must be whether the
officer has probable cause to believe that the person with whom he is dealing may be
armed and dangerous.).
4 Fortas's notes indicate that he disagreed strongly with Harlan's view that
Detective McFadden lacked probable cause to arrest Terry. See id. at 3 (Fortas noting with emphasis "I don't agree" next to Harlan's statement to that effect); id. at 4
(Fortas noting "This is error in the Court's opinion"); id. at 12 (Fortas noting "I do
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dard.4 °5
Justice Black, by contrast, read Harlan's circulation immediately but wrote only one thing on his copy: "Read but I disagree. 4 6
G. A Warren Chambers Assessment of the Justices'Responses
In Chief Justice Warren's chambers, the Harlan circulation
prompted law clerk Earl Dudley to write an extensive and
thoughtful memorandum. Dudley's memorandum is a striking
look at the gestation of Terry inside the Chief Justice's chambers.
According to Dudley's memorandum, Chief Justice Warren
originally had been inclined to decide Terry v. Ohio by writing a
model stop and frisk statute.4 7 Warren wanted to approach the
constitutional and practical issues raised by these police methods, in other words, by replicating his approach two Terms earlier to the issue of police interrogations of suspects in custody,
which had been to craft the now-familiar Miranda warning requirement.408 In the stop and frisk cases, Warren apparently told
his law clerk that he wanted the Court "to try to write our own
annotated stop and frisk statute, a la Miranda."0 9 Indeed, in
mean he [Terry] was 'about to rob a store" next to Harlan's statement to the contrary). Fortas also believed that probable cause had been present in the Peters case.
See id. at 8 (Fortas noting "I don't agree" at the end of Harlan's discussion of Peters);
id. at 15 (Fortas noting "in Peters there was a hell of a lot more than a forced stopthere was force-also in Terry--").
405 See id. at 2, 11- 13. Next to Harlan's statement that he "prefer[red] to use the
words 'reasonable suspicion,' " for example, Fortas scrawled, "But suspicion is an
invidious non-objective term!! Chacun A son gout." Id. at 12 (roughly translated,
"each to his own taste"). Fortas also wrote next to Harlan's statement that "it would
be clearer if two terms were used" that Harlan "shows this to be a word game +
Harlan prefers his words[.]" Id. at 11.
Although Fortas preferred to acknowledge that Fourth Amendment "probable
cause" means different things in different contexts, see id. at 13 (Fortas's marginal
note: " 'probable cause' to search is different from probable cause to arrestProbable cause to search an auto is different from probable cause to search a man's
house"), he did note his agreement with Harlan's efforts to define limits on police
powers to stop people in public places. Id.
"6 Justice Hugo L. Black's Copy of Justice Harlan's Draft Opinion Circulated
Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)
"07 See Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 29, 1968, supra note 270, at 1-2.
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-42 (1966) (Warren, C.J., joined by
Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas, JJ., for the Court).
0 Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 29, 1968, supra note 270, at 1.
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December 1967, when Warren was assigning himself the responsibility of writing the Court's stop and frisk opinions, he still
seemed to be thinking in this vein, for he told the other Justices
in conference that he "would use the [Terry] case to lay down

hard rules for stop and frisk.'

1°

But the proposed opinions he

circulated to the Court in February 1968 did not follow this
"Miranda"path. Given the other Justices' troubled responses to

those circulations, that path not taken was by
411 late February

1968 a matter of some regret, at least to Dudley.
Warren's other perspective on the stop and frisk cases had
been that, if the Court was not going to write a Miranda-like

recipe for constitutional stops and frisks, it should avoid the

"stop" issue altogether and decide only the constitutionality of
Detective McFadden's frisks.412 Despite the comments received
and the individual opinions that other Justices had circulated,
Dudley remained convinced in February 1968 that this was the

right approach.413
In his memorandum to Warren, Dudley spelled out two main
"tactical reasons" why the Court should not decide the stop
question.4 "4 First, he was concerned that a decision legitimating
street stops would mean that such stops would always include
frisks of persons, which were the greater intrusion that the
Court was seeking to control. 415 In Dudley's view, an analysis of

stops would rightly conclude that, because stops are not major
intrusions on pedestrians' legitimate interests, the police should
Douglas Terry Notes, supra note 220, at 1. Justice Fortas, by contrast, had
told the Conference explicitly that he did not want "a Miranda type" opinion. Id. at
4. 411 See Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 29, 1968,
supra note 270, at 1. According to
Dudley:
would have been better from the start to try to write our own annotated stop and frisk statute, a la Miranda, since that seems to be what
everyone ultimately wants to do in any event. It would be preferable at this
stage to be negotiating the terms of the statute than to be arguing, as we
are, about what issues are or are not in the cases. Our opinion suffers in
the context of present discussions, I think, from its attempt to decide Terry
without writing a little statute, though it may simply be that the opinion
does not adequately explain the manner in which it frames the issues.
Id.
412 See id. ("I am more than ever convinced of the essential correctness
of your
view that if a Miranda-type approach is to be avoided, the so-called 'stop' question
need not-in fact, ought not-be dealt with in Terry.").
413 See id.
414 Id. at
2.
415 See id.
at 2-3.
4'0
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be permitted to make street stops on very little basis. 416 The
danger that Dudley saw in this stemmed from the fact that, in
his view, frisks would become incidents to stops automatically.417
Any decision to permit stops liberally thus would become a decision to permit frisks. 48 Dudley argued that the better way to insure fewer street frisks would be a decision that tied the police
power to perform frisks to an element of danger and the selfprotective rationale for the frisk itself.419 Second, although Dudley saw true stops as minimal intrusions, he argued that a prostop decision by the Supreme Court would risk legitimating temporary police detentions of pedestrians, which pose significant
threats to individual liberties that include political beliefs and
practices. 4 0 Dudley argued to Warren that it would be better for

the Court not to decide these "detention" issues, which were not
presented by the facts of Terry, until they were raised in a case
that more clearly exposed the larger values that were at stake.42'
In addition to his tactical reasons, Dudley's memorandum to
Warren spelled out "doctrinal reasons" why the Court should
avoid deciding the constitutionality of street stops.

422

These rea-

sons related to the core problem of defining when and why a police officer's stop of a pedestrian qualified as a Fourth Amendment "seizure."' In Dudley's view, the "stop theorists" did not
provide satisfactory answers to these questions. 424 He wrote that

the right answers could only be found by looking beyond police
actions and law enforcement interests to the public interests

See id.
See id.
41"
Although one alternative approach, exemplified in the proposed Terry, Sibron and Peters opinion that Justice Harlan had circulated on February 27, 1968,
would be to define limits on when and how stops must be conducted, see Harlan
Draft Circulated Feb. 27, 1968: Terry, Sibron & Peters, supra note 375 at 12-13,
Dudley's memorandum to Warren argued that this approach was unrealistic in
hoping that stops could be controlled by judicial fiat, and therefore it was unwise,
see Dudley Memorandum, Feb. 29, 1968, supra note 270, at 4-5.
419 See id. at 5.
42 See id. at 6.
42.See id. Dudley also argued, pointing to the tangled facts of the Wainwright
416
417

case, that a decision approving police power temporarily to detain pedestrians
would involve the Court in an incredible and unattractive regulatory project. See id.
at 7.
4. See id. at 8-11.

42 Id. at 8.
424

Id. at 9-10.
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that are at stake in street encounters with the police.4 " To protect the various public interests that are at stake, Dudley urged
Chief Justice Warren to locate "seizure" at the moment when a
police officer physically restrains a pedestrian or tells her that
she cannot leave.426 Applying this definition to the Terry case,
Dudley wrote that the moment of constitutional "seizure" was
the moment of physical frisk, and thus that the case raised no
constitutional "stop" issue that the Court needed to decide separately.427 Dudley believed, accordingly, that the Court could
leave questions about the constitutionality of a street "detention
for interrogation" for a future case that truly raised the issue.4 "
Although Dudley was still convinced that the Chief Justice
had been correct to circulate proposed opinions that avoided the
stop question, he also recognized that it was very much in doubt
whether a majority of the Court would join Warren's Terry opinion. Dudley wrote:
[i]t is clear that the Terry opinion, as it stands, satisfies no one.
Apparently, no one else presently accepts our view of what
questions are presented in the case and why. This may simply
be because the opinion does not adequately
explain why it has
• - 429
limited the inquiry in the way it has.
In his law clerk's view, the Chief Justice could attempt to gather
a Court majority behind his approach to the case, or he could file
his opinion as his own concurrence while another Justice wrote
for the Court, or he could redraft his opinion to address the
"stop/seizure" issue. 43
None of the available documents indicate much about what
Chief Justice Warren thought of his clerk's insightful memorandum.4 ' Warren did make marks in the margin of the memoran42 See
426

id. at 11-13.

Id. at 13.

See id. at 14.
See id. In addition to this discussion of the Terry "stop" issue, Dudley's
memorandum urged Chief Justice Warren to try to keep five votes in the Peters case
for an opinion holding that there had been probable cause for arrest, even though
Justice Harlan's circulation demonstrated the weakness of that position. See id. at
16-17. Dudley also noted the strength of Harlan's mootness arguments in Sibron,
but urged the Chief Justice to stick to the position that a criminal case can never
become moot on direct review. See id. at 18.
429 Id. at 15.
42
428

43 See

id.

The documents also do not indicate how Warren responded to an extremely
interesting follow up memorandum that Dudley sent the Chief Justice two weeks
4'
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dum at a point that suggests his agreement with the law clerk's
statement that there is, in a police-pedestrian street encounter,
"no 'seizure' until the officer affirmatively restrains a person
from moving, or informs him that he cannot leave."" 2 We can
also surmise from the fact that Dudley's arguments and analysis
echoed Warren's original views of the cases that he continued to
find them to be persuasive in February and March 1968. Yet
Warren's June 1968 opinion for the Terry Court does not reflect
this perspective.
There is an explanation for the apparent gap between what
Chief Justice Warren believed and the decision he ultimately
authored. In Justice Brennan's chambers, the opinion circulations that precipitated the Dudley-to-Warren memorandum contributed to Brennan's own wholesale rethinking of the stop and
frisk cases. Brennan then persuaded the Chief Justice to address the "stop" issue, and to do so within the framework of
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" rather than in terms of
"probable cause." Warren's later circulations of proposed opinions demonstrate his ultimate flexibility in writing the stop and
frisk opinions for as much of the Court as he, with assistance
from Brennan, could garner.

later. See Dudley Memorandum, Mar. 12, 1968, supra note 46, at 1. In this memorandum, Dudley described:
a possible alternative way out of the present impasse. The difficulty, as I
indicated in my [earlier] Memo, is that Terry is not really a stop case ....
It occurs to me that the Wainwright case... is really the only thing approaching a stop case presently before the Court. Wainwright, rather than
Peters and Sibron, may be the proper companion case for Terry. If I read
the Court's mood correctly, there is probably no way to prevent it from attempting to decide the stop issue in these cases, since most Justices seem
to view the stop as a necessary conceptual antecedent to the frisk .... The
Court might hold that the stop in Wainwright was perfectly justified, that
the frisk was also legitimate in light of the danger to the officers if Wainwright turned out to be the murderer they sought, but that when the stop
and the frisk did not turn up probable cause to arrest Wainwright for murder, they were required to let him go and were most emphatically not empowered to take him to the station.
Id. at 1. The Court, which had decided in October 1967 to dismiss Wainwright's petition as improvidently granted, see supra note 146 and accompanying text, ultimately stuck to this course. Chief Justice Warren dissented from this judgment. See
infra text accompanying note 511.
.2
Dudley Memorandum, supra note 270, at 13.
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V. THE SHIFT TO "REASONABLENESS"

A.

Justice Brennan's ContributionBehind the Scenes
Although Justice Brennan had given private advice and editorial input to Chief Justice Warren in early 1968 as he drafted
and redrafted proposed majority opinions in the stop and frisk
cases,433 Brennan's deep involvement did not end with the initial
opinion-drafting. In February and March 1968, he read the proposed opinions that Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
White and Harlan circulated, and he spoke with Justices Douglas and Fortas about their own conversations with, and suggestions to, the Chief Justice."' Brennan then became centrally involved in clarifying and recasting Warren's Terry opinion.
Justice Brennan's involvement in the Court's Terry decision has
been largely invisible, however, because he did not write his own
opinion in Terry or any stop and frisk case.435 Brennan's full role
in the Court's decision is visible only in the papers that he and
Chief Justice Warren each preserved.43
During February 1968, Justice Brennan discussed Terry
with Raymond C. Fisher, who was one of his law clerks during
the Court's October 1967 Term.437 Although the available records
4' See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Jan. 30, 1968) (available in Warren Papers, cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress).
4*4See Handwritten Draft Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief
Justice Earl Warren, entitled The "Stop and Frisk"cases, 1 (available in William J.
Brennan, Jr. Papers, cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Brennan
also read closely his law clerk's evaluative digest of Warrens latest Terry circulation. See Memorandum, Stop-Seizure-Arrest (available in William J. Brennan, Jr.
Papers, cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
45 But see SCHWARTZ, supra
note 235.
43 See, e.g., ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN,
JR.: FREEDOM FIRST 187-88 (1994) (asserting that although "Brennan voted with the

majority in Terry... he consistently opposed making additional exceptions to the
probable-cause standard" and citing his post-Terry opinions in Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985));
PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 191-92
(1994) (quoting from Brennan's March 14, 1968, letter to Chief Justice Warren, see

infra note 456, but noting that "Brennan joined the [Terry] majority" and not explaining the context of his letter to Warren). But see CRAY, supra note 18, at 467
(briefly describing the Justices' conference discussion of Terry and stating that Warren wrote the Court's opinion "[w]ith Brennan's considerable aid-he was to write
the majority of the opinion").
47 See Memorandum by Raymond C. Fisher, Law
Clerk to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., regarding Terry v. Ohio 1 (undated) (available in William J. Brennan,
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do not give much substantive information about these discussions, they do record Justice Brennan's assignment that Fisher
redraft Warren's latest Terry circulation while retaining as much
of Warren's language as possible.4 38 Fisher completed his assignment by drafting a lengthy opinion that would replace all
but the first five pages of Warren's February 21, 1968 Terry circulation." 9 Although Fisher attempted to retain Warren's language, he reorganized and deleted much of it. He also drafted
two appendices that explained the theoretical bases for the
draft's treatments of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause
and the exclusionary rule remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.44 Fisher gave his proposed Terry rewrite and the two accompanying appendices to Justice Brennan in late February or
early March 1968.441 Justice Brennan read Fisher's work closely
and revised it in many spots. The result was a comprehensive
Brennan rewrite of the Court's proposed Terry opinion.442
The Brennan rewrite of Terry contained three significant
sections. After noting his agreement with Warren's recitation of
Jr. Papers, cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Fisher
Memorandum].
438 See

id.

"9 Fisher's draft, which proposed to retain many of Chief Justice Warren's
numbered footnotes, also included more than ten pages of lettered endnotes. These
endnotes were written in the first person from Fisher to Justice Brennan. They explain with particularity Fisher's reasons for proposing alternatives to Chief Justice
Warren's draft text, and also some of his remaining concerns about the replacement
text that he had drafted. See Fisher Terry Draft attached to Fisher Memorandum,
supra note 437, at nn.1-15.
4'0 Fisher's Appendix A set forth in detail his understanding of the role of probable cause in the case. See Appendix A: Relationship to the Warrant Clause, attached to Fisher Memorandum, supra note 437. Appendix B considered how the Supreme Court legitimizes certain types of police conduct when it does not apply the
exclusionary rule to the evidence they produce. See Fisher Terry Draft attached to
Fisher Memorandum, supra note 437, at FN-1, n. b.
"' See Fisher Memorandum, supra note 437. In his cover memorandum to Justice Brennan, Fisher explained that he tried to revise the Chief Justice's Terry
opinion along the lines that they had discussed. See id. at 1. Fisher wrote that he
had tried to retain as much of Warren's language as possible, but he also noted that
he had deleted "a good deal of the Chiefs opinion" because of concerns about its
"tone." Id. at 1. Fisher also noted that an alternative to the draft's approach would
reach the opposite result: reversing Terry's conviction because Detective McFadden
did not, at the time of the stops and frisks, have probable cause to arrest the men
for possessing concealed weapons. See id. at 1-3.
"
See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Rewrite of Terry v. Ohio, attached to
Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 14, 1968) (available
in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Brennan Terry Rewrite].
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the facts, Brennan proposed text that reframed the constitutional question that Terry raised.44 3 In Brennan's view, the case
was about "reasonableness" of stops and frisks under the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, not about the
presence or absence of the probable cause required by its Warrant Clause. In Brennan's words, the case concerned "whether it
is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and
subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause to make an arrest."4"
Brennan's next section of revised text, which is the heart of
his proposed Terry rewrite, explained in detail why
"reasonableness" is the relevant constitutional inquiry regarding
street stops and frisks. In this section, Brennan first explained
that stops and frisks are Fourth Amendment "seizures" and
"searches," and that Detective McFadden clearly had seized and
searched Terry at the moment he stopped and frisked him.445
Brennan then considered the reasonableness of McFadden's conduct, both at its inception and as he conducted the stops and
frisks of Terry and his companions. Brennan explained that because street stops and frisks are not police activities that were,
or ever could be, approved by judges in advance-i.e., because a
"stop-and-frisk warrant" is an impossibility-the reasonableness
of stops and frisks is not to be judged by the presence or absence
of probable cause.44 Probable cause is a component of the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause, and thus a measure of reasonableness in situations where police are engaged in warrant-type
activity. But probable cause is not relevant, Brennan wrote, in
determining the constitutional reasonableness of police activity
that is not of the warrant type." 7

43See id.at 3. Brennan began this section by summarizing the arguments for
and against the constitutionality of street stops and frisks. See id.at 1-2.
Id. at3.
A' See id.at 3-6. Brennan explained that he was basing this constitutional conclusion on the actual stop and frisk moment, and not on the investigative approach
that had preceded it, because the record in the case did not clarify much about what
really had transpired when McFadden approached the three men. See id. at 6.
Brennan noted that, although Justices White, Douglas and Harlan appeared willing
to make a blanket ruling in Terry's case about the constitutionality of "detention for
questioning," he preferred to leave that issue to future cases with more developed
factual records. See id. at FN-3 to FN-4, n.f.
44 Id. at 7.
4 See id.; see also Memorandum, Relationship to Warrant Clause, attached to
Brennan Terry Rewrite, supra note 442 (the final version, reflecting Justice Bren-
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Instead of relying on probable cause as a measure of reasonableness, Brennan's Terry redraft said that the reasonableness of
non-warrant-type police activity must be determined by, first,
identifying the government interest that is involved and, second,
by determining whether specific and articulable facts justify a
particular intrusion. 8 In Terry's case, Brennan said that the
government interests that were involved in McFadden approaching the three men-the stops-were its broad, almost omnipresent, interests in crime investigation and/or prevention.44 9 The interests that were involved in McFadden searching the men-the
frisks-were the much less common need of a police officer to protect himself.450 Regarding the latter interest, Brennan wrote that
it would be constitutionally unreasonable to deny a police officer
the power to frisk where he is justified in believing that a person
is armed and presently dangerous.4 5 '
In the final section of his proposed Terry rewrite, Brennan
explained the objective reasonableness of Detective McFadden's
conduct. McFadden first observed conduct that was a preface to
a stick-up, which demonstrated that stopping the men for questioning was reasonable.4 52 McFadden's subsequent frisks also
were reasonable because a reasonably prudent officer had reason
to believe, while investigating this suspicious conduct, that Terry
and his colleagues were armed and threats to the officer's
safety.4 53 Furthermore, nothing occurred at any point during
McFadden's encounter with the men that dispelled his objectively reasonable beliefs.454 Brennan also noted that, although
the precise Fourth Amendment limits of a protective search
would have to be developed in the concrete circumstances of future cases, the protective rationale for this kind of search defined

nan's edits, of Fisher's Appendix A).
"s See Brennan Terry Rewrite, supra note 442, at 7-8. To permit judicial review
of such police conduct after the fact, the specific and articulable facts must satisfy
some objective criteria. See id.
9 See id. at 9-12.
4- See id.
45' See id. at 12. The draft explained that its approach, in this respect, differed
from Justice Harlan's. Whereas Harlan was concerned to control police power to
stop, this approach would effectively leave to future cases the process of defining
limits on stops. It would instead place real controls on police power to frisk people
on the streets. See id. at 17.
462 See id. at 18.
3 See id. at 11-12.
4 See id. at 18-19.
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a limit
on its scope, and that McFadden had not exceeded this
455
limit.
After Justice Brennan finished editing and finalizing his
proposed rewrite of Terry, he wrote, in longhand, a letter to
Chief Justice Warren. Although Brennan's letter tracked his
own law clerk's memorandum to him, it contained much more
material and documented the Justice's personal involvement in
and anguish about deciding the stop and frisk cases:
The "Stop and Frisk" cases
Dear Chief
I have heard from Bill [Douglas] and Abe [Fortas] something
of their comments upon your opinion, + of their suggestions for
changes. I've read also, of course, the views stated by Hugo
[Black], John [Harlan] + Byron [White] in their circulations. All
of this has prompted me to do some extended + hard thinking,
which I hope I may share with you.
I'm attaching a rather extensive suggested revision of your
Terry opinion with explanatory notes outlining my reasons, and
also a rather extensively foot-noted memorandum stating my
reasons for the conviction I've reached (contrary to my previous
view) that we should not handle this question as a matter of
"probable cause" and the Warrant Clause, but as a matter of the
Reasonableness Clause. I hope you won't think me presumptuous to submit my thoughts in this form-I do it only because I
think it's the best way for me to state them.
You will note that I've retained much of your exposition ....
You will note, too, that I have suggested the omission of a great
deal from your opinion, + this requires a particular explanation.
I've become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in Terry will be taken by the police all over the country
as our license to them to carry on, indeed widely expand, present "aggressive surveillance" techniques which the press tell us
are being deliberately employed in Miami, Chicago, Detroit +
other ghetto cities. This is happening, of course, in response to
the "crime in the streets" alarums being sounded in this election
year in the Congress, the White House + every Governor's office.
Much of what I suggest be omitted from your opinion strikes me
as susceptible to being read as sounding the same note. This
seems to me to be particularly unfortunate since our affirmance

4 5 See id. at 20-22.
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surely does this: from here out, it becomes entirely 4 56 unnecessary for the police to establish "probable cause to arrest" to support weapons charges; an officer can move against anyone he
suspects has a weapon + get a conviction if he "frisks" him +
finds one. In this lies the terrible risk that police will conjure
up "suspicious circumstances," + courts will [crossed out: accept]
credit their versions. It will not take much of this to aggravate
the already white heat resentment of ghetto Negroes against
the police-+ the Court will become the scape goat.
The alternative would of course mean a reversal of the conviction-a holding that there is no constitutional authority to
frisk for weapons unless the officer has probable cause to arrest
for the crime of carrying a weapon[.] I recognize that police will
frisk anyway, + try to make a case that the frisk was incident to
an arrest for public disturbances, vagrancy, loitering, breach of
peace, etc + etc-but at times I think these abuses would be
more tolerable than those I apprehend may follow our legitimating of frisks on the basis of suspicious circumstances[.]
This states frankly my worries. But if we are to affirm Terry,
I [crossed out: hope we may do so without appearing affirmatively to] think the tone of our opinion may be even more important than what we say. If I have exceeded the proprieties, I
hope you will forgive me--I am truly worried.457
Justice Brennan sent this letter, his rewrite of the Court's
proposed Terry opinion and the background paper regarding the
probable cause requirement to Chief Justice Warren on March
14, 1968.458 Although none of the available papers document
what happened next between these principals, their pattern of
close communication, in general and in connection with the stop
and frisk cases, 459 suggests that they discussed, probably at
length over a number of conversations, the recasting of Warren's
proposed Terry opinion. Warren's next circulation makes it clear
that Brennan's input had a decisive impact on the Chief Justice's
thinking about these cases.
4, When Justice Brennan reviewed his secretary's typed version of this letter,
which he drafted in longhand, he made only one substantive revision: he changed
"entirely" to "virtually." See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief
Justice Earl Warren 2 (Mar. 14, 1968) (available in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers,
cont. 171, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (containing Brennan's blue
pencil corrections).
457 Id.
"8 See id. (containing the change discussed in supra note 456).
49 See supra notes 22, 275 and accompanying text.
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B. Chief Justice Warren RecirculatesAgain
On May 31, 1968, Chief Justice Warren circulated a thoroughly revised version of the Court's proposed Terry opinion.460
Although Warren disregarded some of Justice Brennan's advice
that certain passages should be deleted from the opinion, 61 Warren accepted the general reorganization that Brennan had proposed and employed vast sections of the rewritten text-some of
which of course, employed passages from Warren's earlier circulation-that Brennan had provided to him." The Brennan approach had become, more than less, the Chief Justice's proposed
opinion for the Court in Terry.
Unlike the Chief Justice's earlier efforts, this proposed Terry
circulation impressed and garnered approval from most of the
other Justices. Justice Stewart, after first obtaining Warren's
agreement to delete a seven-word phrase deep in the opinion,"
joined the opinion enthusiastically within hours of its circulation.4 Justice Marshall wrote simply that he was "pleased" to
join Warren's opinion.4 Justice Fortas, after reading the circu40 See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Re-circulated May 31,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Warren Majority Draft Re-circulated May 31, 1968:
Terry].
_
,
Tr] Despite Brennan's advice, which was
directly contrary to his initial advice on
this topic, Warren retained his extended discussion of the exclusionary rule and its
limitations as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. See id. at 8-12. He also
ignored Brennan's advice to omit a section characterizing what prior Fourth
Amendment decisions had to say about the permissible scope of a lawful search. See
id. at 14-15.
"2 The overall result (Warren largely accepting Brennan's rewrite but also retaining selected passages from the initial Warren drafts) corresponds well to Professor Amar's theory that the Court's ultimate Terry opinion is actually two Terrys. See
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1097 (1998).
4' See Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Earl Warren (May 31,
1968) (bearing Warren's notation, "Yes") (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
4 Stewart wrote a second letter to Warren on May 31, 1968, after Warren consented to Stewart's suggestion for the opinion. See Letter from Potter Stewart to
Chief Justice Earl Warren (May 31, 1968) ("For me, this case is in many ways the
most difficult one of the Term. I think you have done an excellent job with it, and
am glad to join in your opinion for the Court.") (available in Earl Warren Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
46 See Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(June 3, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
Justice Marshall came to regret his vote in Terry. In Adams v. Texas, which
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lation closely, sent Warren a personal note.466 Fortas offered a
few comments on specific passages in the circulation,"7 but he
came four years later, the Supreme Court had what Justice Marshall described as
its "first opportunity to give some flesh to the bones of Terry." 407 U.S. 143, 153
(1972) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting). The Adams Court included
four new Justices since Terry. The Court held by a 6-3 vote that a police officer did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer, responding to an informant's
tip that a man sitting in parked car possessed narcotics and had a gun in the waistband of his pants, commanded this man to open the car, reached into his waistband,
seized a gun, arrested him immediately for gun possession, and upon searching him
incident to that arrest found and seized narcotics. See id. at 144-45. Justice Marshall, dissenting, described the Court's analysis as inconsistent with Terry, which
"never meant to approve th[is] kind of knee-jerk police reaction." Id. at 159. In addition, in a separate, concluding section of his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall
offered reflections that seemed almost to retract his vote in Terry:
Mr. Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter in Terry. He warned of the
"powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on
the Court to water down constitutional guarantees...." 392 U.S., at 39.
While I took the position then that we were not watering down rights, but
were hesitantly and cautiously striking a necessary balance between the
right of American citizens to be free from government intrusion into their
privacy and their government's urgent need for a narrow exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision demonstrates just how prescient Mr. Justice Douglas was.
It seems that the delicate balance that Terry struck was simply too delicate, too susceptible to the "hydraulic pressures" of the day. As a result of
today's decision, the balance struck in Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the government. And the Fourth Amendment, which was included in
the Bill of Rights to prevent the kind of arbitrary and oppressive police action involved herein, is dealt a serious blow. Today's decision invokes the
specter of a society in which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched,
and arrested at the whim of police officers who have only the slightest
suspicion of improper conduct.
Id. at 161-62. In subsequent cases, Justice Marshall did write or join opinions that
referred to Terry with approval, but only in contexts where Terry was invoked to
describe Fourth Amendment limits on police practices. See Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 439-40 & n.32 (1984) (Marshall, J., for the Court); Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 498-501 (1983) (White, J., joined by Marshall, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
'6 See Handwritten Letter from Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (undated) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress) [hereinafter Fortas Letter to Warren].
Fortas urged Warren to delete his discussions of two topics. Fortas "would
[have] eliminate[d] the theoretical discussion of whether a 'seizure' occurred when
the policeman approached Terry, et al." Id. He suggested that Warren eliminate or
greatly reduce his "abstract discussion" of the limits of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. See id. Fortas was concerned that Warren's "detailed description of what the cops can get away with might not incite them
to greater use of the latitude described!" Id. Warren, however, ultimately did not
change his opinion in either of these respects, See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19
(discussing whether McFadden's approach was a seizure and discussing the remedial limits of the exclusionary rule). Warren did change footnote 16, which Fortas
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told Warren that he could "disregard" them "without affecting
[Fortas's] total agreement" and praised the quality of Warren's
proposed opinion for the Court.468 Justice Black, displaying less
enthusiasm, asked Warren to note Black's concurrence in the
judgment and in Warren's opinion except where it quoted from
or relied upon two previous opinions that Black had opposed.4 69
Justice Brennan, displaying no visible sense of irony, wrote Warren a short note indicating his agreement with an opinion that
was largely his own creation.47°
On June 4, 1968, Warren circulated a revised Sibron/Peters
opinion.47 In response to Justice Harlan's concerns, it contained
a significantly472 expanded section explaining why Sibron's case
was not moot.

Warren's Sibron/Peters circulation got a mixed reaction
from his colleagues. Justice Marshall immediately noted his
agreement with the opinion. 3 Justice Harlan was persuaded by
had, like Justice Brennan, found to be confusing. See Fortas Letter to Warren, supra
note 466; see also infra note 470 and accompanying text (regarding Brennan's objection to footnote 16).
4s Fortas Letter to Warren, supra note 466; see also Typed Letter from Justice
Abe Fortas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (June 4, 1968) (available in Earl Warren
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("I am happy to agree with your
opinion.").
4169See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Chief Justice
Earl Warren (June 3,
1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
The two opinions were Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Justice Fortas's concurring opinion in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
47 See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren
(June 3, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress). Brennan's letter indicates that he spoke with Warren about a particular
footnote. See id. In the Court's Terry opinion, this footnote does not contain the sentences that apparently troubled Brennan. Compare Warren Majority Draft Recirculated May 31, 1968: Terry, supra note 460, at 17 n.16 (speculating about the
constitutional reasonableness of both detentions for questioning that are more intrusive than was McFadden's treatment of Terry, et al., and frisks that are very
brief because they find no weapons) with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)
(no such discussion).
471See Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Re-circulated June
4,
1968: Sibron v. New York & Peters v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers,
Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
472

See id. at 7-16.

473 See Justice Thurgood Marshall's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Re-

circulated June 4, 1968: Sibron & Peters (available in Thurgood Marshall Papers,
cont. 43, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (handwritten note: "I join it
TM"). This brief note is the only trace of Justice Marshall's handwriting in his case
files on the stop and frisk cases.
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Warren's Terry and Sibron/Peters circulations to withdraw his
February 27 circulation addressing these three stop and frisk
cases.4 74 Although Justice Fortas wrote some skeptical comments
in his copy of the circulation, he seemed generally to agree with
Warren's approach.475 Justice Black, however, was unmoved
from his previous view that Sibron's conviction should be affirmed.476
VI. FINAL POSITIONS TAKE SHAPE AND THE COURT DECIDES
A.

JusticeDouglas's Terry Dissent and His Sibron and Peters
Concurring Opinions

Justice Douglas had, until early June 1968, been part of the
unanimous Court vote to affirm Terry's conviction. In the
Court's December 1967 conference, Douglas had voiced his
agreement with Chief Justice Warren's view of the case.477 In
February 1968, Douglas had endorsed Warren's proposed opinion.478 Warren's May 1968 recasting of the opinion, however,
which shifted the rationale for approving the constitutionality of
stops and frisks from an analysis based in probable cause to an
analysis based in reasonableness ascertained by balancing competing governmental and individual interests, caused Douglas to
change his mind.
Douglas's stop and frisk opinions took shape quickly during
the first week of June 1968. When Warren re-circulated his pro474 See Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Chief Justice Earl
Warren (June
5, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
'75 See Abe Fortas's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Re-circulated June
4, 1968: Sibron & Peters (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library,
Manuscripts & Archives) (handwritten note, "this isn't bad," by Fortas's law clerk
David Rosenbloom). Fortas ultimately filed a short concurring opinion in these
cases. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 70 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
'76 See Hugo L. Black's Copy of Warren Majority Draft Opinion Re-circulated
June 4, 1968: Sibron & Peters (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 401, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (Black's handwritten note: "I have dissented
from Sibron but concurred with Peters").
7 See Handwritten notes of Justice William 0. Douglas
from the Conference on
Terry v. Ohio (Dec. 13, 1967) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
478 See Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to
Chief Justice Earl Warren
(Feb. 26, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 624, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress) ("I do not believe that the [changes] I have on Terry change the
basic theme of your fine opinion.").
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posed Terry opinion on May 31, Douglas was hospitalized and
awaiting surgery.47 9 One of Douglas's two law clerks, Carl J. Kim
Seneker II, sent him a memorandum the next day that summarized and critiqued Warren's opinion.4 8 Seneker also, at Douglas's instruction, drafted an opinion taking the position that
there had been probable cause at the times of the seizures in
Terry, in Sibron, and in Peters "to believe that the person seized
had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime,

and therefore that the Court need not reach the question
whether some test different from or less than 'probable cause' is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment."4 81 Over the next few
days, Douglas, with additional research and drafting input from
his clerk,48 decided that he would dissent rather than concur in
Terry, and, thus, to treat each of the three cases in a separate
opinion.
On June 5, 1968, Douglas circulated three short opinions in
the stop and frisk cases. Douglas's proposed Terry dissent decried the Court's abandonment of probable cause as the constitutional requirement for police searches and seizures.'
His

479See generally Stuart Auerbach, How Justice Douglas Lives With Pacemaker,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1968, at Al. On June 4, 1968, surgeons at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center installed a pacemaker in Douglas to correct an abnormal slowing of
his heart during sleep and corrected an intestinal obstruction. See id. at All.
48 See Memorandum by Carl J. Kim Seneker II, Law Clerk to Justice Douglas,
regarding Chief Justice Warren's Majority Draft Re-circulation May 31, 1968: Terry
(June 1, 1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Seneker's main criticism was that Warren's opinion
was "confused in trying to disassociate the 'probable cause' requirement from the
requirement of 'reasonableness'. ... [In focusing upon 'reasonableness' instead of
'probable cause' to take any action, and in failing to discuss the factor of a crime
about to be committed, it [Warren's circulation] appears... to set a dangerous
precedent for a watering down of Fourth Amendment guarantees." I&. at 1.
481 Typed Note from Carl J. Kim Seneker II, Law Clerk to Justice Douglas,
to
Justice Douglas (June 1, 1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1416,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
48 See Typed Note from Carl J. Kim Seneker II, Law Clerk to Justice Douglas,
to Justice Douglas (June 4, 1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont.
1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (reporting on research into the
early American debates on a bill of rights, and on research regarding earlier Supreme Court decisions that separated the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness
Clause from its Warrant Clause); Typed Note from Carl J. Kim Seneker II, Law
Clerk to Justice Douglas, to Justice Douglas (June 5, 1968) (available in William 0.
Douglas Papers, cont. 1416, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (reporting on
Seneker's re-reading of the record in Terry).
483 See Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Dissenting Opinion Circulated
June 5,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manu-
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proposed Sibron concurrence displayed personal sympathy for
the plight of drug addicts and also, in accord with his commitment in Terry to the probable cause standard, declared that
"suspicion" is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for search or
seizure./u Douglas's proposed Peters concurrence merely stated
his view that Officer Lasky had probable cause to believe that
Peters "was on some kind of burglary or housebreaking mission,"
and thus to seize him and to search his person.485
Although other Justices took note of Douglas's opinions
(particularly his Terry circulation 86 ), he was the only defector
from the previously unanimous Court.
B. Justice Harlan'sConcurringOpinions
On June 5, 1968, Justice Harlan withdrew the opinion he
had circulated in February.4 87 He circulated in its stead a short
proposed concurring opinion in Terry that would "fill in a few
gaps" in Chief Justice Warren's latest circulation.4 8 Harlan did
scripts & Archives). The Terry dissent that Douglas filed five days later was the
same as this circulation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
48 See Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Concurring Opinion Circulated June
5,
1968: Sibron v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library,
Manuscripts & Archives) ("[Talking with addicts without more rises no higher than
suspicion. That is all we have here; and if it is sufficient for a 'seizure' and a 'search,'
then there is no such thing as privacy for this vast group of 'sick' people."). The Sibron concurrence that Douglas filed five days later is the same as this circulation.
See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 68 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring in No. 63).
"'See Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Concurring Opinion Circulated June 5,
1968: Peters v. New York 2 (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives). Interestingly, although Douglas seemed to be saying that Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters and to search his person incident
to that arrest, Douglas did not use "arrest" terminology in this brief opinion. The
Peters concurrence that Douglas filed five days later is the same as this circulation.
See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 68-69 (Douglas, J., concurring in No. 74).
4"See Justice Hugo L. Black's Copy of Douglas Draft Dissenting Opinion Circulated June 5, 1968: Terry (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, cont. 402, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) (note by Justice Black: "Read[.] No comment"); Justice Abe Fortas's Copy of Douglas Draft Dissenting Opinion Circulated June 5, 1968:
Terry (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) (note by Justice Fortas: "Noted"). But see id. at 1 (note by H. David Rosenbloom, law clerk to Justice Fortas: "darn it, this is a fine dissent-HDR).
4w See Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra
note 474.
4" See Justice John M. Harlan, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated June 5,
1968: Terry v. Ohio (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Harlan Concurring Draft Circulated June 5, 1968:
Terry]. A typed draft of this proposed opinion indicates that Harlan's initial reaction
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so because he recognized that the Court's opinion would "serve
as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts
the land as this important new field of law develthroughout
489
ops.))

Harlan's Terry opinion accomplished four things. First, it
stated plainly the Court's holding that the Constitution permits
a police officer to make street stops and frisks, despite his lack of
a warrant and the absence of probable cause, if such actions are
"reasonable under the circumstances as the officer credibly relates them in court" after the fact.49 Second, Harlan stated that
the Court was approving frisks that police officers make to protect themselves from people they have stopped. 491 Third, Harlan
stated that a constitutional question that is antecedent to establishing the reasonableness of a self-protective frisk is establishing the reasonableness of the forcible stop that put the potentially dangerous person in proximity to the police officer in the
first place.492 Fourth, Harlan explained that where the basis for
a lawful stop is "an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence,"
that same suspicion makes it reasonable to frisk "immediatefly]
to Warren's May 31 Terry circulation was to concur only in its result. See Justice
John M. Harlan, Initial Draft Concurring Opinion: Terry v. Ohio (available in John
M. Harlan Papers, cont. 350, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University):
I regret that I am unable to join the Court's opinion .... In its effort to
avoid rigid general rules that might have unfortunate consequences in the
future,... the Court has, I think, failed to give an adequate explanation of
the decision in the case before us.... [R]ules stated here must serve as
guidelines for the police and the courts, and... it is essential that they be
clear.
Id. Harlan later deleted criticisms of the Chief Justice's opinion from his own draft
opinion that he circulated to the other Justices, recasting it as a full concurrence.
See id.
48 Harlan Concurring Draft Circulated June 5, 1968: Terry, supra note 488, at
1.
.4Id. Harlan did not include in this opinion, however, the extensive argument
for the "reasonable suspicion" standard that had been part of his initial circulation.
See supra notes 394-398 and accompanying text.
4" As he had in his February circulation, see supra note 375, Harlan distinguished this self-protective rationale for the frisk from the frisks that could occur in
a state that had granted its police officers "routine authority to frisk and disarm on
suspicion." Harlan Concurring Draft Circulated June 5, 1968: Terry, supra note 488,
at 2. Perhaps to encourage such state legislation, Harlan added the comment that
he had "little doubt that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable." Id. at 1. On his copy of the Harlan circulation, Justice Fortas
drew large question marks next to this assertion. See id. at 1-2.
492 See id. at 2-3.
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and automatical[lyl." 4 ' Putting all of these elements together,
Harlan494 categorized Terry as "a proper stop and an incident
frisk."

Two days later, Harlan circulated a proposed opinion concurring in the results of the judgments that the Court was about
to render in the New York cases, Sibron and Peters.495 As a
threshold matter, he disagreed with the Court's refusal to acknowledge that the language of New York's stop and frisk statute was consistent with the Court's forthcoming Terry decision.49 6
Harlan also took the occasion to state flatly that Terry was deciding that• • a,,491street "stop may indeed be premised on reasonable
suspicion,
which was consistent with his earlier recommenda498
tion that the Court employ "reasonable suspicion" phraseology.
Harlan then addressed the constitutionality of the particular
police conduct that was at issue in each case. In Sibron, Harlan
abandoned his previous view that the case was moot because Sibron had finished serving his sentence and suffered no collateral

"3 Id. at 3. Justice Fortas, apparently finding the factual record of Terry to be
less clear and compelling than Harlan did, circled Harlan's statement that Detective
McFadden had "an articulable suspicion" of a violent crime and wrote "Christ!" in
the margin. See id. at 3.
49 Id. The Terry concurrence that Harlan filed five days later is substantially
the same as this circulation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4 See Justice John M. Harlan, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated June 7,
1968: Sibron v. New York, Peters v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale
University Library, Manuscripts & Archives) [hereinafter Harlan Concurring Draft
Circulated June 7, 1968: Sibron & Peters]. For an edited typescript draft of this
opinion, see Nos. 63 and 74, Sibron & Peters, available in the John M. Harlan Papers, cont. 305, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
496 See Harlan Concurring Draft Circulated June 7, 1968: Sibron & Peters, supra
note 495, at 1-2. In Harlan's view, the New York provision, which permitted police
officers "to stop any person reasonably suspected of crime," was generally equivalent
to the Court's decision in Terry that a street "stop may indeed be premised on reasonable suspicion." Id. at 2. Justice Fortas, by contrast, in his own brief proposed
concurring opinion in the New York cases, expressed his view that a statute
authorizing a warrantless search might be so extreme that it would be unconstitutional on its face, "regardless of the facts of the particular case." Justice Abe Fortas,
Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated June 7, 1968: Sibron v. New York, Peters v.
New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts &
Archives). The Sibron concurrence that Fortas filed five days later is substantially
the same as this circulation. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 70 (1968) (Fortas,
J., concurring).
197 Harlan Concurring Draft Circulated June 7, 1968: Sibron & Peters,
supra
note 495, at 2.
""'See supra notes 394-98 and accompanying text.
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consequences based on his criminal conviction.49 9 Harlan then,
addressing the merits of the case for the first time since his remarks at the Court's conference, concluded that Officer Martin's
stop of Sibron was unreasonable under the forthcoming Terry
standard, and that the unconstitutional stop automatically rendered the frisk unconstitutional."0 In Peters, Harlan reiterated
his earlier analysis that Office Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters.0 1 Although Harlan thus disagreed with Warren's
proposed conclusion for the Court, Harlan nonetheless wrote
that he concurred in the Petersresult because Lasky's stop of Peters was based upon reasonable suspicion and therefore was constitutionally reasonable under Terry."'2
C. The Court'sStop and Frisk Decisions
On Monday, June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court announced
its decisions and filed its opinions in Terry, Sibron, and Peters.
Chief Justice Warren announced his two opinions for the Court
and also, on behalf of his colleague who was out recovering from
0 3 The decisions
surgery, Justice Douglas's lone dissent in Terry."
made headlines, and the Court generally was applauded for its
sensitivity to the safety interests of law enforcement officers."'
D. DismissingWainwright
Until the Justices finalized their opinions and the Court
handed down its decisions in the other stop and frisk cases,
Wainwright v. New Orleans continued to be a case on hold. Justice Douglas, calling from outside the Court during his convales-

4' See Justice John M. Harlan, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated June 7,
1968: Sibron v. New York, Peters v. New York (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale
University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
m See id. at 3-4.
5o1 See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 8-9. The opinion that Harlan filed five days later in the New York
cases is substantially the same as this circulation. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 70 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
'0
See Note from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (June
10, 1968) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 352, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress).
5o4 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, High Court Backs Rights Of Police To Stop And
Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1968, at 1; 'Unreasonable'Still Stands, N.Y. TImES,
June 12, 1968, at 46 ("There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's 8-1 [Terry]
decision... will help persuade policemen that the Court does not lie awake nights
dreaming up ways to increase the hazards of their jobs.").
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cence, attempted (apparently unsuccessfully) to have Chief Justice Warren make Wainwright an action item on the Court's conference list in late May 1968.505 Douglas subsequently became
concerned that the case was "lost" and wanted the Court's dismissal of Wainwright's petition-and Douglas's dissent therefrom-to be announced with the other stop and frisk decisions on
June 10.506 But the Court did not schedule Wainwright for final
conference consideration until the afternoon following the
Court's announcement of its Terry, Sibron, and Peters decisions. °7
In the week of the Terry, Sibron, and Peters decisions,
Douglas made a series of final edits to his proposed Wainwright
dissent. He used the opportunity to continue, in effect, the process of dissenting from the Court's Terry decision. In a series of
late inserts to his proposed Wainwright opinion, Douglas called
Terry "an ill-starred case."0 8 He wrote that Wainwright "points
up vividly the dangers which emanate from the Court's decision
in Terry" to "dilute0" the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement. 9 and analogized the New Orleans police officers'

5 See Note from Fay Aull, secretary to Justice William 0. Douglas (May 27,
1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (reporting to Douglas that she had called Chief Justice Warrens
secretary and told her that Douglas would like Wainwright to be on the next conference list).
6" See Memorandum from Fay Aull, secretary to Justice William 0. Douglas, to
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (June 7, 1968) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) Douglas telephoned his
secretary during the Court's June 7, 1968, conference, which he was missing because he was recuperating from surgery, and had her send a note to Justice Brennan in the conference. The note said that Douglas had "received the list of cases
coming down and that No. 13-Wainwright v. City of New Orleans is not on the list.
He wrote a dissent to the Per Curiam. The case was put over for the Stop and Frisk
Cases and he is concerned that it is going to get lost." Id.
Brennan sent a note out from the conference to Douglas's secretary, stating
that "Wainwright is being held for a conference after court on Monday" June 10 and
promising that "[wlhatever is decided will be on the order list for a week from Monday." Handwritten Note from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Fay Aull, secretary
to Justice Douglas (undated) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
07 See Handwritten Note from Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. to Fay Aull, supra note 506.
508 Justice William 0. Douglas Draft Dissenting Opinion Re-circulated June 12,
1968: Wainwright v. New Orleans 4 (available in Abe Fortas Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts & Archives).
Id. at 5. Douglas wrote that the officers who approached Wainwright in the
French Quarter

1998]

DECIDING THE STOP AND FRISK CASES

treatment of Stephen Wainwright to the practices of authoritarian (or worse) foreign governments.510
On Monday, June 17, 1968, the Supreme Court announced
its per curiam decision to dismiss Wainwright's petition as improvidently granted and the filing of separate concurring opinions by Justices Harlan and Fortas, and separate dissenting
opinions by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas.5" Only
Douglas, who suggested that the Court recently had changed
"traditional Fourth Amendment standards" in Terry, took jabs at
that decision by name.512

had no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that petitioner
[Wainwright] was a murder suspect, a suspicion based only on a superficial
resemblance between petitioner and the wanted man. Certainly, they did
not have "probable cause" to believe that petitioner was the murderer
within the historical meaning of that term .... Thus, in my view, they had
no right to seize the petitioner. But, after Terry, whether that seizure was
constitutionally permissible no longer depends upon the presence of
"probable cause." Just how much less is sufficient is not clear. Did the officers here have "reasonable suspicion" justifying the seizure, or reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous?... The
Court's opinion in Terry seeks objectivity; but once the constitutional standard of "probable cause" is diluted, I see no realistic limit to the amount by
which it may be diluted.
Id.

510 Douglas initially invoked "Franco Spain" and "Soviet Russia." Id. at
6. In
various subsequent iterations, he mentioned "modem Iran," "the so-called
'democratic' Formosa," Albania, Vietnam, Korea and Pakistan. See Justice William
0. Douglas Draft Dissenting Opinion Re-circulated June 14, 1968: Wainwright v.
New Orleans 6 (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). The opinion that he ultimately filed expressed his "fear
that with Terry and with Wainwright we have forsaken the Western tradition and
taken a long step toward the oppressive police practices not only of Communist regimes but of modem Iran, 'democratic' Formosa, and Franco Spain, with which we
are now even more closely allied." Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 615
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5" On the same day, the Court also denied a certiorari petition that challenged
the constitutionality of a law enforcement officer's basis for stopping, searching and
seizing heroin from persons at the U.S.-Mexican border. See Brett v. United States,
392 U.S. 945 (1968). Although the Court was originally scheduled to consider this
petition in a February 1968 conference, it apparently deferred considering it, at
Justice Fortas's request, until the Court decided the stop and frisk cases. See Note
from Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Feb. 27, 1968) (available in
Earl Warren Papers, cont. 352, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("I suggest that this case be removed from the Special List and held for the stop and frisk
cases."). Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of this petition. See Brett, 392
U.S. at 945.
,12 Wainwright, 392 U.S. at 610; accord id. at 613, 614-15.
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VII. CONCLUSION: OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUSTICES'
WORK, THE STOP AND FRISK DECISIONS AND THE COURT'S

PROCESS OF DECIDING

The Justices' papers regarding the stop and frisk cases, including their memoranda, conference notes, draft opinions and
private jottings, permit us to understand in new ways the Warren Court's adjudication of Terry v. Ohio and its companion cases
during the October 1967 Term.
Although we have known Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Wain-

wright-at least their outcomes, and the opinions that were filed
in each case-since June 1968, it is only the Justices' papers that
show us the Court's process of decision-making. The papers
show that in conference the Justices voiced nine individual perspectives on the issues that the cases raised. Although there
were some divisions in the Justices' voting in the secondary
cases, the Justices did vote unanimously in conference to affirm
John Terry's conviction, based upon their view that Detective
McFadden had probable cause to frisk Terry and his two companions. Only after conference, when Chief Justice Warren circulated proposed opinions that failed to persuade his colleagues,
did the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis change from an assessment of probable cause to a determination of reasonableness.
Warren, the author of Terry, actually used much of an opinion
that Justice Brennan, who is not identified as an opinion writer
in the case, had ghost-written for Warren and persuaded him to
use. Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter in Terry, initially agreed
with the other Justices and offered supportive input as Warren
worked to describe McFadden's probable cause for the street
questioning and frisks he conducted. Douglas remained "on
board" until Warren shifted the analysis from probable cause to
reasonableness.
Only then did Douglas begin to write the
seething Terry dissenting opinion, and the other separate opinions in the stop and frisk cases, that he ultimately filed.
The papers also show the Court's outstanding and sophisticated performance as an institution. The Court, as a collective,
worked hard and communicated well in conference, in the circulations of proposed opinions, and in the private communications
among and between the Justices about stop and frisk issues in
their full constitutional complexity. The papers reveal, in a very
raw and immediate way, the intellectual powers, work habits
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and personal traits of individual Justices.513 The papers also
demonstrate the capable and wholly appropriate support that
the law clerks provided to the Justices, who by all indications
were fully on the job and doing the actual judging for themselves.
In the realm of constitutional criminal procedure, which has
come to be a collection of doctrinal categories, Terry v. Ohio, at
age thirty, is a Supreme Court decision that we know well. We
know that the Terry Court identified police conduct short of formal arrest that nonetheless constitutes "searches" and "seizures"
under the Fourth Amendment. We know that the Court, by balancing the relative intrusiveness and public purposes of this police conduct, approved the constitutional "reasonableness" of
stops where the police have objective and articulable bases to
believe that crime is afoot, and frisks where the police have objective and articulable bases to believe that persons lawfully
stopped are armed and pose dangers to the police or others.
Many thus think of Terry and the law of "stop and frisk" as a
well-settled matter, a sensible balancing of public interests in
law enforcement against relatively lesser intrusions on personal
freedom, and a measure of constitutional justification"reasonable suspicion"-that police officers on the street, and
also courts evaluating police conduct after the fact, can use effectively in deciding whether a particular intrusion is constitutionally permitted.
The papers of the Supreme Court Justices reveal what came
before "Terry v. Ohio" was all of that, and what Terry and its
companion stop and frisk cases presented to the Justices in the
internal work of the Court. In the October 1967 Term, the Supreme Court was nine individuals engaged-intellectually and
emotionally-in the process of deciding among competing analytical approaches to the question of how to apply the Fourth
Amendment to police stops and frisks. The Justices carefully
sorted through the difficult legal and policy issues that flowed
from each of these approaches. The papers show that the Justices were concerned to control abusive police practices on the
streets without unduly hampering law enforcement.
Some
thought that they should decide Terry only as a "frisk" case, and
5'3Two of the most striking things that the papers document are the brilliance
of Justice Fortas, who wrote many profound insights in his notes and in the margins
of various circulations, and the selfless support that Justice Brennan provided to
Chief Justice Warren as he crafted opinions for the Court.

840
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that they should do so by imposing real limits on the police
power to frisk, leaving questions about on-the-street questioning
and investigative detentions for later cases. Others thought
that, as an analytical matter, the frisk issue could not be decided
without first resolving "stop" questions. The latter view, first
suggested by Justice Brennan, ultimately prevailed through a
process of persuasion and compromise by the Justices.
Although we think of Terry and the constitutional law of
stops and frisks as well-settled rules and categories, the Justices'
papers also demonstrate that there was, from the time of the
Court's conference discussions in the fall of 1967, through the
drafting and commenting process that ended in the stop and
frisk decisions of June 1968, an openness to multiple possibilities
and doctrinal outcomes. One path that ultimately was not taken
is the approach that Chief Justice Warren wanted in his heart of
hearts: promulgating a Miranda-like frisk rule. It is of course
impossible, without knowing the exact language of a rule and the
contingent course of subsequent events, to evaluate how this approach would have worked doctrinally, politically or practically.
The Terry result itself eliminated the need, and thus any political interest, to enact stop and frisk laws to empower the police.
And the Court's fiat rejection in Sibron of New York's statutory
approach also suggested that it would be difficult to enact a constitutional prescription for generically proper stops and also
frisks. On the other hand, one way to view Terry itself is as
something of a common law rule. Terry has, at least with the
developments in later cases, become a known formula.5 14 Thus,
while Chief Justice Warren never embarked consciously on the
project of writing a stop and frisk "statute," his Court and the
later Supreme Courts may well have done so in effect, with
Fourth Amendment law ending up on the path that Warren
wanted all along.
A second path, visible in the conference remarks of most
Justices and in Chief Justice Warren's first circulations of proposed stop and frisk opinions, was to stick to the "probable
cause" requirement of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause.
This approach took a unitary view of police actions that constitute Fourth Amendment "searches" or "seizures." According to
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Warren's early drafts, this approach would have required police
officers to satisfy the requirements of the Warrant Clause whenever they searched or seized or, where obtaining a warrant was
impossible, at least to justify their conduct with the "probable
cause" that is a component of that Clause. The Justices' papers
reveal that when Warren tried to write an opinion that used this
standard, however, the Court quickly fractured, coming together
again only after Justice Brennan persuaded the Chief Justice to
ground the opinion in the Reasonableness Clause.
What if the Court had approved only stops and frisks that
were based on Fourth Amendment probable cause? Justice
Douglas, in his Terry dissent, implied that once some stops and
frisks could be justified on less than probable cause, the protections of this Fourth Amendment component would erode in all
contexts, including the full-blown arrests where "probable cause"
should retain its full constitutional meaning. 15 The past thirty
years may provide some support for this claim, but the Justices'
papers also establish that the converse proposition-that sticking with "probable cause" would have preserved its full meaning
as a significant limit on the police-is hardly self-evident.
Douglas himself, in conference and in the memorandum that he
wrote to Chief Justice Warren when Warren still was writing a
Terry opinion for all the Justices, proposed to approve street
stops when the police had probable cause to believe that crime
was imminent.51 6 Douglas admitted, however, that this probable
cause regarding incipient crime was, by definition, a less certain
level of justification than is probable cause for a custodial arrest.51 7 This admission-that "probable cause for this seizure"
might differ from "probable cause for that seizure"--undercuts
the central claim of Douglas's Terry dissent that the Court there
did new violence to the Fourth Amendment. As other Justices
seemed to recognize, staying on the probable cause path in Terry
would have meant at least beginning the process of developing a
unique meaning for that level of justification in each search and
seizure context. Even if that development would not have led
,51See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6 See supra Part IV. E.
See id.; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39 (1967);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The test of
'probable cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought.").
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necessarily to later decisions pulling all "probable cause" requirements down to the level of its weakest form, the Court certainly would have been, as Justice Fortas remarked in conference, "inventing a new probable cause" for stops and frisks. The
result would have been a two-tiered system operating under the
single label "probable cause."
Did the Court then make a mistake by not taking another
path-going all the way and, as Justice Harlan advocated,5 18 announcing with a new label (reasonable suspicion) that it was approving stops and frisks that were based on less justification
than the Fourth Amendment requires for a lawful arrest? In
1968, most of the Justices were unwilling to take that step in the
direction of semantic candor. Later Courts, following Harlan's
lead,519 have not been so reserved, however, and "reasonable
suspicion" is now, of course, a well-used measure of Fourth
Amendment justification.52 °
The Justices' notes and the proposed stop and frisk opinions
that the Court circulated in 1968 do not say explicitly why the
Warren Court was reluctant to embrace "reasonable suspicion"
in 1968. These papers suggest that fidelity to the words of the
Fourth Amendment played a role, and also that pragmatic considerations were present throughout the Court's stop and frisk
deliberations. The Court was, and it knew that it was, deciding
these cases in a particularly turbulent time. Concerns about societal reaction and consequences seem to have played roles not
only in the judgments themselves, but also in the decisions to21
deny oral argument time to the NAACP Legal Defense522Fund
and to write the Terry opinion as only barely a race case.
518

See supra text accompanying notes 394-98.

9 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 70

(Harlan, J., concurring).
5120See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1418 (1997) (holding that if
police have a "reasonable suspicion" that the announcement of their presence
"would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of
the crime," a "no-knock" entry is justified); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-36
(1990) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment allows a "protective sweep" of
premises that are an arrest scene if the searching officer has a "reasonable suspicion
of danger"); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 & n.14 (1983) (authorizing

area searches during investigative detentions by police who "have the level of suspicion identified in Terry").
521 See supra text accompanying note 138.
522 In the Court's Terry opinion, the only mention of race is a disembodied, generic reference to "[tihe wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain."
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The Justices' papers, by illuminating the many compromises
that Terry embodies and the genuine trepidation with which at
least some of the Justices gave their approvals to police stops
and frisks, also help us to understand some of the Justices' later
regrets. Justice Marshall, who as a newcomer to the Court was
relatively uninvolved in the Court's internal arguments over the
stop and frisk cases, all but stated in later cases that he had
voted wrong in Terry.su Justice Brennan, the shadow author of
the Court's opinion, never made so flat a statement, but some of
his later opinions are very hard to square with the approach that
he persuaded Warren to take in 1968. 52
But that is the ultimate point: it was 1968, and the Justices
of the Warren Court did the best they could then to apply the

Constitution sensibly to the stop and frisk problem."u

It is to

their great credit that their papers permit us to understand how
they went about the hard work of making these difficult deci-

Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
Similarly, although the Court's decision not to decide Wainwright may genuinely have been based on its factual imperfections alone, an explanation grounded in
the societal context of the time also seems possible. In 1967 and 1968, the Justices
might well have preferred to avoid endorsing physical resistance by civil rights protesters, anti-war protesters and others who then were being arrested illegally but
generally were taking it non-violently.
2 See supra note 465.
524 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359-60
(1985) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Brennan argued:
[T]he provisions of the Warrant Clause-a warrant and probable causeprovide the yardstick against which official searches and seizures are to be
measured. The Fourth Amendment neither requires nor authorizes the
conceptual free-for-all that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used
to assess specific categories of searches. If the search in question is more
than a minimally-intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional probable cause
standard determines its validity.
Id.; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the result) (emphasizing "that Terry v. Ohio... was a very limited decision
that expressly declined to address 'the constitutional propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or
interrogation' " (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16)); Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., for the Court) (stating the general rule that
"Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause").
525 See Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation,in THE
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 23-24 (Mark Tushnet,
ed., 1993) (characterizing Terry as a not atypical instance of the Warren Court's
realism triumphing over its idealism). But see MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 95-96 (1998) (explaining that Terry marked the
end of the Warren Court's efforts to reform the criminal justice system).
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sions. The Justices did not merely create the modern Fourth
Amendment law of stop and frisk. They facilitated, in their preserved papers, public understanding of the Supreme Court and
its work.

